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Preface
The search equilibrium environment is designed to model an equilibrium in the labour
market in the presence of search frictions. Following Pissarides (2002), under search
friction we understand any time delay in getting a job by unemployed worker or,
similarly, filling an open vacancy by a firm. Historically, search equilibrium models
originate from one-sided job search models that described exclusively the behaviour
of the labour supply side under incomplete information about offered wages. Early
contributions to the economics of job search include McCall (1970) and Gronau (1971)
among many others. In relatively similar environments they derive an optimal stopping
rule for an unemployed agent who has a limited access to job offers, drawing only
one such offer per period of time. Later on this framework was extended to include
the possibilities of quitting and dismissals . Other influential contributions to the
development of one-sided job search models set the following benchmarks. Jovanovic
(1979) introduces job matching with noise and uses this to explain age-earnings profile
and the negative correlation between quits and tenure. Mortensen (1977) studies time-
limited unemployment insurance and its effects on exit from unemployment. Van
den Berg (1990) generalizes a job search model to allow non-stationary wage offer
distribution and duration dependence in both benefit payments and arrival rates of job
offers.
None of the papers on one-sided job search, however, was able to reproduce the
empirically observed wage dispersion. Moreover, agents behaviour represented by these
models may not be consistent with equilibrium behaviour, since the labour demand side
was completely ignored. These two facts brought to life extensions of one-sided models
that resulted in the creation of a search equilibrium framework.
There exist two main ways of modelling search equilibrium on the labour market,
which mostly depend on the view of the nature of search frictions and the nature of
equilibrium wage setting. The first approach is to view search frictions as incomplete
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information about the location of the vacancy, which generates a time delay until the
unemployed worker and firm with the vacancy are matched. This approach was taken
by Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1985). In this setting the wage is
determined through a decentralized Nash bargaining process as long as the application
of the Nash solution to the equilibrium wage determination is justified (see Binmore et
al., 1986). The second approach to modelling a search equilibrium is to assume that
search frictions are the result of workers’ incomplete information about offered wages.
In this case workers sequentially draw wage offers (one per period) and then accept or
reject it before each new draw. This view of search frictions is taken form the early
job search models and is integrated into the search equilibrium framework by Diamond
(1971), Albrecht and Axell (1984) and Burdett and Mortensen (1998). In view of the
“take it or leave it” nature of the match formation, wage setting in this framework is
modelled as a result of wage posting game among employers.
Both approaches have their comparative advantages. As shown by Pissarides (1990),
the first one has a richer potential for describing equilibrium flows into and out of un-
employment, since the relevant hazards can be functions of labour market tightness,
workers’ search intensity, etc. At the same time the approach is less informative about
on-the-job search and wage offer distributions. Namely no endogenous wage offer dis-
tribution can be obtained using this approach, which implies limited possibilities for
the empirical applications. In contrast the model with wage posting and on-the-job
search, solves for the unique wage offer distribution which is a key feature that facil-
itates the estimation of the model. Moreover, this environment is more suitable for
studying heterogeneous workers and firms and therefore interconnections between in-
dividual qualities, labour market institutions and market equilibrium outcomes. Since
the work presented in this thesis is of the empirical, rather than economic-theoretical
nature, we concentrate on the second class of models.
In the framework of a search equilibrium with job search and wage-posting utility-
maximizing workers search for a better offer while profit-maximizing employers set
wages given the acceptance criteria of workers (e.g. reservation wage) and wages that
are posted by competitors. These two assumptions together imply that from the very
outset search frictions in the form of uncertainty about a better offer gives the employer
relatively more power in wage setting. However, as Mortensen and Pissarides (1999)
indicate, this relative monopsony advantage is constrained by competition with other
employers in wage posting.
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The first wage-posting model of search equilibrium was constructed after Diamond
(1971) . In this model information available to workers was limited to one offer per
period of time and no offers after job acceptance, i.e. no search on the job. Workers were
assumed to be homogeneous with respect to their opportunity costs of employment and
employers were assumed to be homogeneous with respect to their productivity. The
main result implied by Diamond’s (1971) analysis was that there exists only one wage
offer in equilibrium from all competing employers and it is exactly the reservation wage.
To overcome the problem of a unique equilibrium wage offer Albrecht and Axell
(1984) suggest that searching agents may have different values of leisure when un-
employed. This assumption triggers the heterogeneity of the labour supply side with
respect to reservation wages. As a result the equilibrium solution for the model is a so-
lution with a dispersed wage offer. Albrecht and Axell (1984) solve their model for two
different levels of leisure value and end up with a discrete wage offer distribution with
two points of support and an endogenously determined probability of offering each of
these wages. Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) also show that without loss of generality
the assumption of different leisure value can be treated as an assumption of differential
costs of search. In both cases, the most remarkable result is the endogeneity of the
wage offer distribution. However, the intrinsic feature of this distribution is such, that
all points of its support are necessarily reservation wages of one or another group of
workers.
To address the inconsistency of a reservation wage based support with empirical
facts, Burdett and Mortensen (1998) extend information assumptions, suggesting that
after any accepted offer worker can still search on the job for a better offer. They
show that with allowing for on-the-job search it becomes possible to derive an equi-
librium solution with endogenously determined dispersed wage offers even with purely
homogeneous workers and employers. Furthermore in their solution, the wage offer is
characterized by a continuous offer distribution. The fact that in this solution wages
greater than the reservation wage are also paid can be explained by efficiency wage
considerations and the threat of losing part of the match surplus by employers. It is
also worth noticing that by setting the arrival rate of job offers to employed workers to
zero (i.e. eliminating on the job search) the solution of Burdett and Mortensen (1998)
converges to that of Diamond (1971).
In the case of a purely homogeneous model, however, Burdett and Mortensen (1998)
face a strictly increasing wage offer density, which theoretically implies strictly increas-
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ing earnings density. Since in reality empirical earnings densities have a decreasing right
tail, two further extensions of the model were attempted. These were the introduction
of heterogeneity of workers with respect to opportunity costs of employment and the
introduction of heterogeneity of employers with respect to productivity. Burdett and
Mortensen (1998) show that in the second case the solution implies acceptable (however
still locally increasing) shapes for the earnings density. Moreover, if the productivity
dispersion is discrete the resulting equilibrium wage offer density has discontinuous
jumps. Continuity of the productivity distribution, to the contrary, implies continuity
of the offer distribution.
Bontemps et al. (1999) attempt to solve the Burdett-Mortensen model with si-
multaneous heterogeneity of both supply and demand side. However, because of the
theoretical complexity, an analytical solution in their case could be derived only under
the assumption of equal arrival rates of job offers to unemployed and employed agents,
which is a strong assumption. To overcome the restriction to arrival rates equality
and at the same time keep the model tractable Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) suggest
somewhat different assumptions on the wage setting process. They rather assume that
firms can vary wage offers according to some particular characteristics of the worker
and firms can counter the offers from outside firms. These two amendments generate
a new mechanism of wage setting that implies tenure-increasing wage trajectories for
any worker within a firm. Moreover, job to job transitions with an initial wage cut but
the expectation higher payment in future become possible.
Along with the development of the theoretical models of search equilibrium with
wage posting, with key contributions just listed above, there has also been emerging
a literature on the empirical implementation of these models. Structural econometric
models considered in this literature aim at connecting the parameters of the theoretical
model and the derived solution for the wage offer distribution to the observed wage and
duration data. Similarly to the evolution of the theory, empirical search equilibrium
models originate from conventional duration models and one-sided empirical job search
models.1 Pioneering work in the estimation of search equilibrium models with wage-
posting was accomplished by Eckstein and Wolpin (1990) who estimate Albrecht and
Axell’s (1984) model extended to more than two types of workers. Unlike all the
successors who were building their estimation methodology on the basis of hazard rate
1Extensive literature review on the one-sided empirical job search models can be found in Devine
and Kiefer (1991).
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models, Eckstein and Wolpin (1990) viewed unemployment duration as a period by
period probability of staying in this given state of the labour market. Such an approach
results in a likelihood function that is a mixture of negative binomial distributions
with parameters restricted by economic-theoretical implications of the model. In their
analysis Eckstein and Wolpin (1990) find that the model fails to fit the data and that
almost all wage variation is due to the introduced measurement error. This finding
along with absence of on-the-job search (and hence implications about employment
durations) and the support problem of the wage offer distribution inherent to Albrecht
and Axell (1984) model called for the use of a better specification, which turned out
to be a model of Burdett and Mortensen (1998).
A homogeneous version of the empirical Burdett-Mortensen equilibrium search
model was first estimated by Kiefer and Neumann (1993) and Ridder and van den
Berg (1993), (1998). In contrast to Eckstein and Wolpin (1990) the likelihood function
for this model was already relying on the observed wage and duration data. Apart
from the improvements in the estimated offer distribution, an important feature of this
model is the inclusion of employment durations. Using the hazard rates implied by the-
ory and appropriately specified transition probabilities the model offers a possibility to
study job to job transitions and outflows into unemployment. The relative simplicity of
the econometric model allows to follow workers for more than one change of the state,
as Ridder and van den Berg (1998) do. They also introduce measurement error and
parameterize search intensities, making them dependent on the segment of the supply
side, which every worker belongs to. This segmentation approach to heterogeneity is
particularly helpful, since empirically it allows to study equilibrium behaviour of het-
erogeneous groups of workers even in the case when the underlying theoretical model
is purely homogeneous.
Still, the shortcoming of the homogeneous model lies in the fact that the pre-
dicted theoretical earnings distribution has an increasing density. To overcome this
complication and attain a decreasing right tail, Koning et al. (1995) and Bowlus et
al. (1995), (2001) estimate the model with heterogeneous productivity of the demand
side. Koning et al. (1995) assume the lognormal productivity distribution. Bowlus et
al. (1995), (2001), to the contrary do not make any assumptions on the parametric
form productivity distribution. It is rather assumed that this distribution is discrete.
Using Mortensen’s (1990) findings on the endogeneity of the productivity distribution,
the latter group of authors estimates its support and point mass probability values
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from the data. Their approach is more advantageous in the sense of minimizing the
impact of distributional assumptions on productivity levels. However, the estimated
wage offer and earnings densities are discontinuous with jump points at the wages that
correspond to estimated productivity points. Wage offer and earnings densities esti-
mated by Koning et al. (1995) do not suffer from discontinuity. Though, Bontemps
et al. (2000) argue that the true productivity distribution cannot be approximated by
lognormal or any other density. As a remedy to the danger of misspecification Bon-
temps et al. (2000) assume that the productivity distribution is continuous and suggest
a nonparametric procedure for estimation of the structural parameters of the model.
The procedure turns out to be both easy in computation and robust to specification
errors for the underlying productivity distribution.
The most comprehensive version of the model with heterogeneity of both supply
and demand sides represented by continuous distributions of opportunity costs of em-
ployment and productivity of employers was estimated by Bontemps et al. (1999).
However, as already mentioned in the discussion of the theory, unemployed and em-
ployed workers in this model are assumed to have the same arrival rates of job of-
fer. This assumption is too restrictive at least in view of the results of Bontemps et
al. (2000), who reject the formal hypothesis of arrival rates equality. Consequently,
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) assume a different wage setting mechanism that already
allows estimating the structural model with heterogeneity on both sides of the mar-
ket with unrestricted arrival rates. Their estimation procedure is a further extension
of the nonparametric method offered by Bontemps et al. (2000). The advantage of
the empirical model developed by Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) is that, in a unified
search equilibrium framework, it both represents workers’ heterogeneity with respect
to opportunity costs of employment and offers a possibility to study the dependence
of workers’ search behaviour on their observed characteristics. The disadvantage is,
however, a higher degree of computational complexity compared to Bontemps et al.
(2000).
Reviewing the literature on the estimation of the equilibrium search model with
wage posting one can notice that the assumption of the continuous productivity dis-
persion and subsequent nonparametric procedures become standard because of their
relative simplicity and a “perfect” fit (the nonparametric estimate of the observed
earnings distribution directly substitutes the theoretical earnings distribution in the
likelihood function). At the same time all the existing methods of this type assume
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that the earnings data are completely observed. In the first chapter of this thesis we
address the case in which wages are top coded (right-censored) and suggest a method
of estimating the the specification of Bontemps et al. (2000) even in presence of incom-
plete earnings information. The suggested econometric model is easy to implement and
shares all the features of the original specification of Bontemps et al. (2000) model,
taking into account the bias due to the right censoring.
The next chapter further investigates the application of the nonparametric methods
of estimating the search equilibrium models. Here we look into the properties of the
productivity distribution implied by the specification of Bontemps et al. (2000). The
authors state that the model provides consistent estimates of search frictions only if
the predicted productivity density is a proper density that does not take negative val-
ues. However it is not possible to exclude the improper densities without an additional
constraint that is also developed by Bontemps et al. (2000). In our analysis we find
that this constraint cannot always be fulfilled and there may exist situations in which
no positive Poisson arrival rate of job offer can guarantee the nonnegative values of
the productivity density. Such situations, dubbed “constraint inconsistency”, occur
whenever there appear clusters of rich individuals far at the right tail of the earnings
density. We quantify this phenomenon and derive a simple condition that tells before-
hand about the applicability of the nonparametric method of Bontemps et al. (2000).
At the same time we also find that the alternative model of Bowlus et al. (2001) with
discrete productivity dispersion is robust to the above described clustering. The fully
parametric approach, which in this particular case outperforms the nonparametric one,
is applied to learn about the changes in the search behaviour of unskilled and elder
workers induced by the reform that prolonged the entitlement to unemployment insur-
ance benefits in West Germany. We find that the low-skilled workers were adversely
affected by the reform which made the increase in their unemployment rate dispro-
portionately high. The reform has turned out to have no effect on the unemployment
rates of the old workers. However it has significantly increased their incentives to go
into early retirement.
The third chapter provides further elaborations on the specification of the econo-
metric search equilibrium model. From the review of the theoretical and empirical
literature above we can see that essentially the only way to induce the decreasing right
tail of the theoretical earnings density predicted by the model is to introduce produc-
tivity differentials (either discrete or continuous). In the third chapter we consider the
vii
extension of the original Burdett-Mortensen model that assumes explicit skill differ-
ences and a general production function with complementary skill inputs and the degree
of homogeneity greater than one. The theoretical extension is developed by Christian
Holzner and is adapted from Holzner and Launov (2005). Within this extension it is
possible to show that whenever the homogeneity degree of the production function is
sufficiently high we get the theoretical earnings density with a falling right tail even
in the absence of employer heterogeneity. Subsequent introduction of different produc-
tivity types is essential only for a better fit to the data. The econometric counterpart
of the theoretical extension draws on the ideas of Bowlus et al. (2001). However in
our setting we have such new features as identification problem for the structural pa-
rameters and specification restrictions that insure continuous offer distributions (in the
theoretical part continuity must be assumed since with skill multiplicity it is impossi-
ble to rule out the mass points in the offer distribution). Our estimated parameters
for the degree of homogeneity clearly indicate the increasing returns and are broadly
consistent with the results reported in the productivity analysis literature. We apply
the model to estimate the effect of the marginal shift in the skill structure towards
more high skilled workers in West Germany. The question of interest here is whether
this marginal shift can generate a positive excess value after covering private costs of
further education of a marginal individual. Evidence of such excess value would point
at the underinvestment into education and, as a consequence, at the sub-optimality
of the existing skill structure. Our findings indicate a strong underinvestment into
education at the low-to-medium skill level.
To summarize, the thesis deals with extending the existing structural econometric
models of search equilibrium in different directions (incomplete earnings information
in Chapter 1, skill multiplicity with increasing returns technology in Chapter 3) and
further elaborating on the properties of these models (limitations of nonparametric
approach in Chapter 2).
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Chapter 1
The Model With Continuous
Productivity Dispersion
1.1 Introduction
A considerable part of the empirical work on the estimation of search equilibrium
models is connected to the estimation of a Burdett-Mortensen model, in which the
equilibrium wage offer is determined as a solution to a wage-posting game among com-
peting employers. In pioneering contributions Kiefer and Neumann (1993), van den
Berg and Ridder (1993), (1998) consider the specification with identical workers and
employers. This specification, however, has a drawback. Namely, the theory implies
that the earnings density has an increasing right tail, which contradicts general empir-
ical evidence. Taking this into account Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and Bontemps
et al. (2000) demonstrate that assuming productivity differentials among employers
can lead to a decreasing right tail of the theoretical earnings density. Using this result
Bontemps et al. (2000) and Bowlus et al. (2001) formulate the econometric models
with a heterogenous labour demand side. The two latter contributions differ from
each other in their assumptions about the productivity distribution of the firms. Bon-
temps et al. (2000) assume that the productivity distribution is continuous and get a
strictly decreasing right tail. Bowlus et al. (2001) consider the discrete productivity
distribution and get a locally increasing right tail. Different assumptions about the
productivity distribution also lead to the conceptually different estimation strategies.
The procedure of Bowlus et al. (2001) is less attractive computationally because along
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with the structural parameters of the model one needs to estimate the kink points of
the wage offer distribution and the likelihood function is discontinuous at these kink
points. The estimation procedure of Bontemps et al. (2000) does not have this feature
and maximum likelihood estimates of the structural parameters can be found using
standard gradient-based methods.
However, despite the estimation method of Bontemps et al. (2000) is preferable
to the one of Bowlus et al. (2001), its applicability may not always meet the data
requirements. One such case occurs when the earnings data are top-coded (i.e. cen-
sored from above). In this case the former method cannot be used, because it relies
on the nonparametric estimates of the earnings density and distribution functions and
the direct application of kernel estimators to the sample with top-coded earnings will
necessarily lead to inconsistent estimates of the structural parameters. The procedure
of Bowlus et al. (2001) to the contrary, uses the theoretically derived functional forms
for the earnings density and distribution. This allows treating the right-censored wage
information in the standard way and thereby estimate the structural parameters of the
model consistently. Application of the latter strategy, however, comes at great com-
putational cost once we seek to provide a successful approximation to the continuous
productivity distribution by a discrete one.
In this chapter we suggest a simple amendment to the nonparametric procedure of
Bontemps et al. (2000) which will make it robust to the top-coded wages. The idea is
to provide an approximation of the right tail of the earnings density on the top-coded
subsample by a certain parametric form. Knowledge of the functional form will allow
specifying censored individual contributions to the likelihood function in the correct
way. Combined with the nonparametric specification for the rest of the observations
we obtain the model that consistently estimates the parameters and still shares all the
advantages of the Bontemps et al. (2000) specification. It turns out that when the
amount of censoring is not too large the sought approximation of the right tail is readily
available. Fichtenbaum and Shahidi (1988) discuss a similar problem in application
to inequality measurement with incompletely observed data. Their main result is
that on its rightmost end any earnings density can be successfully approximated by
the Pareto density. The result of Fichtenbaum and Shahidi (1988) is nothing but
additional evidence that supports the original finding of Vilfredo Pareto, who has
discovered that after crossing a certain threshold the plot of the log-number of income-
earning individuals is linear in the log-income scale. This phenomenon is also known
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as “Pareto Power law” (see Reed, 2001, for the extensive discussion). In this chapter
we exploit this feature of the earnings distribution to formulate the likelihood function
that correctly accounts for the top-coded wages.
Our results can be particularly important to those who try estimating the pa-
rameters of the search equilibrium models using the data from the Social Security
records etc., since wage information in this kind of administrative data is typically
top-coded. The reason for using administrative data instead of household surveys is,
usually, their higher quality. As a rule, such data contain daily information about the
job/unemployment durations, which both minimizes measurement error and increases
the precision of the estimates. Furthermore, for certain countries the appropriate and
long enough panel data surveys may simply not exist.
Apart from discussing the methodology we also estimate the model with the data
from the Austrian Social Security records and describe the equilibrium outcomes in
the Austrian labour market at the two different points of time. In this application we
consider three indicators of the labour market performance. First of all we analyze
changes in the expected unemployment durations predicted by the model. Then we
focus on the changes in career advancement under which we understand job-to-job
transitions and speed of climbing up the earnings ladder. Finally we analyze the
changes in firms’ profitability and their monopsony power in wage setting. It is worth
noticing that with respect to job-to-job changes Mayrhuber and Url (1999) find that
job mobility in Austria is becoming surprisingly high. Using our search equilibrium
setting in which expected job duration depends not only on the arrival rate of a job
offer, but also on the complete wage offer distribution, we can explicitly represent
the expected job duration as a function of the prospects of getting a better offer. This
allows disentangling job mobility patterns of the workers who belong to different income
groups and thereby getting a more detailed picture of the speed of job change.
Finally, we also consider the robustness of the model to parametric assumptions on
equilibrium offer and productivity distributions.
The chapter is structured as follows. The second section provides brief overview of
the main theoretical results of the model. The third section describes the data. In the
fourth section we discuss the nonparametric method of Bontemps et al. (2000). Here we
emphasize the problem of incompletely observed earnings and suggest the solution. The
fifth section contains the estimation results and the results of the sensitivity analysis.
Summary of our main findings is presented in the conclusion.
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1.2 Main Theoretical Results
The model incorporates both labour supply side [workers] and labour demand side
[employers] who meet on the market. Workers search for jobs and employers offer job
opportunities. Both types of agents are rational. Workers maximize their utility of
being employed and employers maximize their profits.
Workers are risk-neutral and homogeneous with respect to their opportunity cost of
employment b. Equal opportunity costs of employment leads to a common reservation
wage R.
There are two states in which workers can be, namely, “employment” and “un-
employment”, and workers are allowed to search whenever both employed and unem-
ployed. Change of states is assumed to follow Poisson process. Transition from current
to a better paid job is also qualified as a change of state, so there are three Pois-
son arrival rates that govern all transitions in the working history. We define arrival
rates of a job offer to an unemployed and employed worker as λ0 and λ1 respectively.
Arrival rate of a layoff is δ. The search process of an individual is formalized as a
repeated drawing of the offers from a certain [known to worker] distribution F (w) and
acceptance or rejection of the offer after each draw. It is important to notice that
rejected wage offers are unobserved. Available earnings data are just current salaries
of employed individuals and so are necessarily the accepted wages. Therefore instead
of offer distribution F (w) only earnings distribution G(w) can be observed. Searching
workers face an optimal stopping problem. If the agent is unemployed, Mortensen and
Neumann (1988) show that the solution for this problem is a reservation wage
R = b + (λ0 − λ1)
∫ w
R
F̄ (x)
δ + r + λ1F̄ (x)
dx (1.1)
where F̄ (x) = 1 − F (x), supp(F ) = [R, w], b stands for benefits and r is the real
interest rate. If the agent is employed, the solution is to accept any wage greater than
the currently earned one. This constitutes workers’ prescription for utility maximizing
behavior. Following Mortensen and Neumann (1988) without loss of generality we can
associate λ0 and λ1 that satisfy (1.1) with agents optimal search intensities.
To formulate the employers’ problem we start with two important findings, both
due to Burdett and Mortensen (1998). Let U be a steady state number of unemployed
workers, M the total number of supplying agents and N the steady state number of
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active firms. Equating equilibrium flow into and out of unemployment Burdett and
Mortensen (1998) demonstrate that the equilibrium rate of unemployment is
U/M = δ (δ + λ0)
−1 (1.2)
and there exists a unique dependence between the unobserved offer and the observed
earnings distribution (density) functions, that can be written down as
F̄ (w) =
δ
δ + λ1G(w)
Ḡ(w) (1.3a)
f(w) =
δ (δ + λ1)
[δ + λ1G(w)]
2 g(w) (1.3b)
where Ḡ(w) = 1−G(w). Moreover Burdett and Mortensen (1998) derive the amount
of workers l attracted in the steady state by a firm that offers wage w
l(w) =
M − U
N
δ (δ + λ1)[
δ + λ1F̄ (w)
]2 (1.4)
where l(w) is an increasing function of the wage offered.
Returning to the employers’ problem, every firm maximizes once own profit with
respect to wage paid
π = max
w
(p− w)l(w) (1.5)
with l given by (1.4).
In this chapter we consider a version of the model in which employers are het-
erogeneous with respect to their productivity and the probability distribution of the
productivity across active firms Γ(p), is continuous, supp(Γ) = [p, p]. Solving (1.5)
Bontemps et al. (1997), (2000) firstly show that whenever Γ(p) is continuous there
exists a unique single valued, monotone and continuous function w = K(p), which
maps the support of the productivity distribution Γ into the support of the wage offer
distribution F . Secondly they demonstrate that more productive firms offer higher
wages. These two facts imply that
F (w) = Γ(K−1(w)) (1.6)
which is a generalization of the well-known result of Mortensen (1990) for the discrete
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productivity distributions (see also Chapter 2, p.46). Using (1.6) Bontemps et al.
(2000) find the solution to the optimal wage setting problem (1.5) of a p-type firm
K(p) = p− [δ + λ1Γ̄(p)
]2 ∫ p
R
dx[
δ + λ1Γ̄(x)
]2 (1.7)
which completes the steady-state solution of the model. Eventually, Bontemps et
al. (2000) show that whenever the upper bound of the support of the productivity
distribution is finite there exists at least one equilibrium on the market. A formal
definition of market equilibrium follows.
Definition 1.1: A market search equilibrium is a triple {F (w),W ,Kp} such that:
1. The distribution of wage offers is F (w) =
∫
F (w|p)dΓ(p), where Γ(p) is a pro-
ductivity distribution of firms, active in the market
2. W = max{R, wcurrent} is the workers’ best response to firms’ wage-posting be-
havior; R defined in (1.1)
3. Kp = arg max{π(p, w)|R ≤ w ≤ w} is a profit-maximizing wage posted in equi-
librium by each p-type firm; π(p, w) defined in (1.5) and Kp defined in (1.7)
Unlike in the case with discrete Γ(p) considered by Mortensen (1990), the theoretical
solution of the model with continuous productivity dispersion does not provide the
closed form for the equilibrium wage offer distribution F (w). It is easy to see that it
is impossible to solve (1.6) given (1.7) analytically. This creates a potential problem
for the conventional parametric estimation of the model. However, Bontemps et al.
(2000) overcome this drawback by suggesting a very simple yet powerful nonparametric
alternative. Their “nonparametric three-step” method is reviewed in Section 1.4.1.
1.3 The Data
In the present survey we use the data from the Austrian Social Security records. They
represent working history of individuals who were followed through a fifteen year period
from 1984 to 1998. All observations are made on 30.05 of each year. Each year-
specific block of individual data includes gender, age, earnings before tax, professional
affiliation, employment status and the dates and types of employment history events
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Table 1.1: Duration Data for the Austrian Labour Market
Sample 1988 Sample 1994
Number of Individuals 3404 [1.000] 3726 [1.000]
Employed: 3110 [0.914] 3361 [0.902]
Unemployed: 294 [0.086] 365 [0.098]
Employed Agents 3110 [1.000] 3361 [1.000]
Uncensored observations with:
job-to-job transition: 646 [0.208] 658 [0.196]
job-to-unemployment transition: 500 [0.161] 630 [0.187]
mean time spell between the two states: 43.189 42.324
(std. deviation): (34.884) (33.008)
Censored observations:
a) left-censored durations only:
with job-to-job transition: 365 [0.117] 73 [0.022]
with job-to-unemployment transition: 257 [0.083] 77 [0.023]
b) right-censored durations only: 257 [0.083] 1085 [0.323]
c) both left- and right-censored durations: 1085 [0.349] 838 [0.249]
mean duration [both censored and uncens.]: 91.793 88.019
(std. deviation): (59.159) (56.026)
Unemployed Agents 294 [1.000] 365 [1.000]
Uncensored observations (u → j transition): 34 [0.116] 29 [0.079]
mean time spell between the two states: 7.962 5.638
(std. deviation): (8.256) (3.226)
Censored observations
a) left-censored (u → j transition) only: – –
b) right-censored durations only: 3 [0.010] 48 [0.132]
c) both left- and right-censored durations: 257 [0.874] 288 [0.789]
mean duration [both censored and uncens.]: 18.978 23.630
(std. deviation): (26.496) (27.461)
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that have happened during the previous year. Using the guidelines of van den Berg
and Ridder (1998) we draw two samples at 1988 and 1994 and restore labour market
histories of all sampled individuals. To restore the employment history we track every
individual backward(forward) until the date of his/her entry to(exit from) the current
state or until we reach the lower(upper) end of the observation period.
All individuals in the data set are divided into the four employment status cat-
egories: “employed”, “unemployed”, “on study” and “other”. In what follows we
consider only “employed” and “unemployed” ones. The reason is that the theoretical
model is restricted to only these two states of the labour market. It is believed that
individuals who fall into the rest of the groups have incentives different from the agents
described by the model. Therefore common practice leaves them out (see van den Berg
and Ridder, 1993, 1998).
For the same reason we exclude part-time workers. Unfortunately, there is no di-
rect indication of part-time employment in the data. To draw our samples with the
least possible noise we argue that if an agent works on a full-time basis, his/her in-
come is at least as high as the legal minimum wage before tax. Thus individuals,
with income below the minimum should be left out of consideration. Here we should
also notice that in fact there is no uniform legal minimum wage in Austria. Instead,
every year unions in all industries bargain with employers for minimum wages that
should be paid in respective industries throughout the whole year. As an approxi-
mation for a single minimum wage we take an average of the agreed within-industry
wages, which are available from the annual reports of the Austrian Central Statistical
Office. Such way of leaving out potential non-participants also provides a more reliable
estimate of the lower bound of support of the unknown offer distribution, which other-
wise would have been R̂ = min {w} as suggested by Kiefer and Neumann (1993). This
commonly used minimum sample estimator is sensitive to measurement error, which
in view of no full-time employment indication would be definitely present in our data.
Proceeding as above we end up with two data samples with 3404(294) employed(un-
employed) at 30.05.88 and 3726(365) employed(unemployed) at 30.05.94. Summary
statistics of the duration lengths is given in Table 1.1. Durations are measured in
months; fraction of the sample is given in square brackets. From Table 1.1 it is easy to
see that the average job duration was remaining roughly the same over the observed
period. So, if there were changes in the job mobility, as Mayrhuber and Url (1999)
indicate, they may be detected only after considering heterogenous groups of agents.
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Figure 1.1: Earnings Density 1988
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Figure 1.2: Earnings Density 1994
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One can also notice the considerable discrepancy between the average duration of the
completed employment spells and the average duration of both completed and incom-
plete employment spells. This is a sign of relatively high degree of duration dependence
in the data. The same can be said about the unemployment spells. Additionally the
expected length of unemployment in the later period has become somewhat longer than
in the earlier one.1 Finally, there was a slight increase in the unemployment rate from
8.64% to 9.80%.
Summary of the earnings information is presented by the two kernel density plots
in Figures 1.1-2 for years 1988 and 1994 respectively. We can see that the conventional
kernel density estimator is severely biased at the right tail. This bias occurs because
kernel function tries to smooth out a point mass generated by top-coding. For year
1988 this point mass, i.e. the share of right-censored wages in the whole sample, makes
8,03%. In the sample of 1994 as much as 9.61% of the wages are top-coded. Figures
1.1-2 also plot the bias corrected estimator which not only accounts for top-coding but
also provides the left tail correction (see Section 1.4.2 for details). However, despite
being able to consistently estimate the density on the observed part of the support of
the earnings distribution the bias-corrected estimator tells us nothing about the shape
of the right tail above the censoring threshold (dashed vertical line on both plots).
Facilitating the parameter estimation under no information about the shape of the
right tail behind the censoring threshold is the primary goal of this chapter.
In comparable prices, mean earnings in years 1998 and 1994 have made ATS 19678
and 21105 respectively. Standard deviations for both statistics are ATS 6797.4 and ATS
7033.5 (note that due to right censoring the reported means are downward biased).
1.4 Estimation Methodology
Structural parameters {λ0, λ1, δ} are estimated from the econometric model that relies
on wage and duration data. The general approach to the construction of the likelihood
function is based on Lancaster (1990) and van den Berg and Ridder (1998). Addition-
ally we discuss the modifications, which are necessary to account for the top-coded
earnings data.
1One should keep in mind, however, that all the measures of duration lengths in Table 1.1 are
downward biased because of incomplete spells. The specification of the econometric model which will
be discussed in the next section will take this into account.
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1.4.1 The Likelihood Function
The backbone process of the model is Poisson, so the waiting time between any two
adjacent events is exponentially distributed with parameter θ. However, this property
can not be applied directly, because the sampling scheme used to retrieve the job
histories is not random. Ridder (1984) demonstrates that under the described above
sampling the spells with the longer length have higher probability of being included
into the resulting data set. To overcome this problem Ridder (1984) suggests analyzing
a joint distribution of elapsed (te) and residual (tr) durations of a spell.
About the distribution of the elapsed duration it is known that certain time te ago
there was a renewal of states and since then an individual spent at least te in a new
state. Renewal probability for Poi(θ) is shown to be equal to θ (see Lancaster, 1990).
On the distribution of the residual duration our knowledge is that given a certain
elapsed time te an individual spends in this state additional time tr (tr > 0). Therefore
the appropriate densities are:
Elapsed: f(te) = θe
−θte
Residual: f(tr|te) = θe−θtr , tr > 0
Joint: f(te, tr) = θ
2e−θ(te+tr), tr > 0
For unemployed agents the corresponding Poisson rate is just λ0. For unemployed ones
the correct Poisson rate is a sum of transition intensities to either unemployment δ or
a better-paid job λ1F̄ (w), i.e. θ = δ + λ1F̄ (w).
To complete the formulation of the individual contributions to the likelihood we
notice that:
• for Unemployed: Equilibrium probability of sampling an unemployed agent is
given by (1.2). In case the subsequent job transition is observed we know the
offered wage and can record the value of the wage offer density f(w).
• for Employed: Equilibrium probability of sampling an agent who earns wage w
is g(w)λ0/ (δ + λ0). In case the agents’ transition to the next state is observed
we record the destination state. The probabilities of exit to unemployment and
to next job are πj→u = δ/
(
δ + λ1F̄ (w)
)
and πj→j = λ1F̄ (w)/
(
δ + λ1F̄ (w)
)
respectively.
Taking an account of incompletely observed elapsed/residual durations is relatively
straightforward. In case of left censoring we drop the renewal probability and in case
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of right censoring we drop exit probability and change the residual density with the
survivor function. With these results Lu and Le individuals become
Lu = δ
δ + λ0
λ2−dr−dl0 exp {−λ0(te + tr)} f(w)1−dr (1.8)
Le = λ0g(w)
δ + λ0
[
δ + λ1F̄ (w)
]1−dl exp{− [δ + λ1F̄ (w)
]
(te + tr)}
×
[[
λ1F̄ (w)
]dt
δ1−dt
]1−dr
(1.9)
where dl = 1, if a spell is left-censored, 0 otherwise, dr = 1, if a spell is right-censored,
0 otherwise and dt = 1 if there is a job-to-job transition, 0 otherwise.
One can see that both (1.8) and (1.9) involve the unknown theoretical wage offer
distribution and density functions. As it was mentioned in Section 1.2 no analytical
solution for F (w) is available. In view of this Bontemps et al. (2000) suggest the
following “nonparametric three-step procedure” for the estimation of the structural
parameters:
1. On the first step compute the non-parametric estimates of g(w) and G(w)
2. On the second step use (1.3a)-(1.3b) and ĝ(w) and Ĝ(w) to substitute the un-
known offer density and distribution functions in (1.8)-(1.9) with the expressions
that contain structural parameters only. Maximize the likelihood function with
respect to {λ0, λ1, δ}.
3. Use
{
λ̂0, λ̂1, δ̂
}
and ĝ(w) and Ĝ(w) to calculate the unknown productivity levels
p and productivity density γ(p).
For the third step Bontemps et al. (2000) show that
p = w +
δ + λ1G(w)
2λ1g(w)
(1.10)
and
γ(p) =
2δλ1(δ + λ1)g(w)
3
3λ1g(w)2[δ + λ1G(w)]2 − g′(w)[δ + λ1G(w)]3 (1.11)
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Two points worth mentioning here. First of all the model is well-specified only if
the denominator in (1.11) is positive. In case it is not, Bontemps et al. (2000) suggest
the constrained maximum likelihood estimation. Though, as we will show in Chapter
2 there may exist the cases in which the constrained optimization may not always
be feasible and the whole nonparametric approach of Bontemps et al. (2000) breaks
down. Secondly, the formulation above relies on the completely observed earnings data.
As we have discussed in the overview of the data this is not the case in the present
application. In Section 1.4.2. we suggest the way out.
Finally we comment on the estimation of the support bounds of earnings distri-
bution. Usual practice (see Kiefer and Neumann, 1993, or Bowlus et al., 1995) is to
use R = min(w) and w = max(w). In the present application we rather use aver-
age of agreed within-industry minimum wages as an estimator for R. For w we keep
w = max(w).
1.4.2 The Problem of Top-Coded Wages
As it was mentioned in Section 1.3, about 10% of top earnings observations in both
samples are censored. Absence of information on the wages from the upper decile of the
earnings distribution makes the nonparametric estimation of its right tail unfeasible.
To solve this problem we follow the suggestion of Fichtenbaum and Shahidi (1988) and
Reed (2001) and approximate the top-coded right tail by the right tail of the Pareto
distribution. Informally, we split the support of G(w) in two intervals. On the first
interval we use nonparametric estimates of g(w) and G(w), on the second one we take
g(w) and G(w) to be of a Pareto form.
Consider the first interval. To consistently estimate the distribution function we
use the Product-Limit estimator which is known to be robust to the right censoring of
the data (see Lancaster, 1990, for the derivation and the overview of basic properties).
To estimate the density we follow Padgett (1988), who suggests a version of a kernel
estimator suited to the case when right censoring is not random and the censoring
threshold is the same constant. The estimator has a simple form
g̃(w) =
[
nh−1
] n∑
j=1
K
(
w − wj
h
)
[Ij : wj < w
c] (1.12)
where Ij is an indicator function that takes value 1 if wj is less then the value of the
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censoring threshold wc and zero otherwise. Padgett (1988) also justifies an application
of Gaussian kernel for (1.12).
Additionally, Vuong et al. (2000) show that whenever the distribution is defined on
a compact set any kernel density estimator is asymptotically downward biased towards
tails. Bontemps et al. (2000) state that this bias is precisely E [ĝ(w)] → g(w)
2
and
suggest the following bias-corrected kernel estimator:
ĝ(w) = g̃(w)
[
Φ
(
x− w
h
)]−1
(1.13)
Note that in view of right censoring and subsequent Pareto approximation the expres-
sion in (1.13) presents a version of the estimator with only left tail correction making
it suitable for our study.
Now consider the approximation of the earnings distribution on the second interval.
Let ρ (w|α, β) and P (w|α, β) denote the Pareto density and distribution functions. The
survivor function for the Pareto distribution can be written down as
1− P (w|α, β) = αβw−β
One of the key properties of this survivor function is that the plot of ln(1 − P (w))
against ln (w) is linear. Thus the approximation of the earnings distribution of the
free form G(w) by the Pareto distribution will be justified only on the segment where
ln(1− Ĝ(w)) is linear against ln(w).
With our data linearity of the log-log plot of 1− Ĝ(w) amounts to the top 10% of
the observed wages in both samples. This corresponds to broad evidences that Pareto
law of incomes is a property of the two upper deciles of the earnings distribution (see
Reed, 2001). By substitution of ln
(
1− Ĝ(w)
)
into the l.h.s. of
ln(1− P(wi)) = β ln α− β ln(wi) + εi (1.14)
both scale parameter α and shape parameter β of the Pareto distribution are estimated
by least squares using the observed part of the second interval.2
Knowing α and β, hence the exact form of the Pareto tail , we specify the individual
contributions to the likelihood function in a standard way. If the wage is top-coded
2Roughly, this will be the ninth decile of the earnings distribution.
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the individual contribution to the likelihood (1.8)-(1.9) becomes
L̃u = δ
δ + λ0
λ2−dr−dl0 exp {−λ0(te + tr)}
[(
δP̄(wc)) / (δ + λ1P(wc))
]1−dr
(1.15)
L̃e = λ0P̄(w
c)
δ + λ0
[
δ + λ1F̄ (w
c)
]1−dl exp{− [δ + λ1F̄ (wc)
]
(te + tr)}
×
[[
λ1F̄ (w
c)
]dt
δ1−dt
]1−dr
(1.16)
where P̄(w) = 1−P(w). If, the wage is observed but still falls into the interval where
Pareto form is valid, the likelihood function remains the same as in (1.9) with the only
difference that now ρ (w) and P (w) will be substituting g(w) and G(w) in (1.8)-(1.9).
Statistical properties of the MLE from (1.15)-(1.16) will be the same as of those
obtained from the fully observed earnings sample, provided that (1.14) consistently
estimates the parametric form of the right tail of the earnings distribution. Asymptotic
covariance matrix of the estimated structural parameters will be, however, unknown at
least because of the presence of the nonparametric estimates ĝ and Ĝ in the likelihood
function. Therefore, as in the original paper of Bontemps et al. (2000), we bootstrap
the confidence intervals for
{
λ̂0, λ̂1, δ̂
}
.
Before concluding we also need to notice that yet another way of estimating Pareto
parameters can be suggested. In the alternative formulation the break point between
non-parametric and parametric forms could be explicitly introduced as a parameter of
the likelihood function. This, however, would lead to the fact that the support of the
likelihood contributions for certain individuals would become a function of the unknown
β, which would lead to MLEs with non-standard properties. Moreover, in this situation
the application of extreme order statistics (see Kiefer and Neumann, 1993, and Donald
and Paarsch, 2002) is not possible because the lower bound of the support of the Pareto
distribution for the tail does not need to coincide with the observed sample minimum
wage. However, this alternative formulation a promising way of research.
1.5 Estimation Results and Discussion
In this section we consider the implementation of the proposed method. The main pur-
pose of this part of the chapter is not to make a particular statement about the economy
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but rather to consider the performance of the suggested econometric procedure.
1.5.1 Pareto Parameters
We start with discussing the fit of Pareto distribution to the right tail of the earnings
distribution. As already mentioned before, in both samples the linearity of 1 − Ĝ(w)
in the log-log plot against wages amounts to the top 10% of the observed earnings
data. Using this sub-sample we estimate the parameters of the Pareto distribution by
non-linear least squares applied to (1.14). Table 1.2 contains the results.
From this Table it is easy to see that both regressions provide quite reliable estimates
of the Pareto parameters. First of all the number of observations is large enough
to secure high precision of the estimates. Secondly, in both cases the range of the
regression interval and its ratio to the range of the whole sample is sufficiently big
to make sure that the inference is not made on a cluster. Finally the coefficients of
determination indicate a very good fit of Pareto tail to the actually observed tail.
Altogether, the results presented in Table 1.2 show that on the rightmost of G(w)
Pareto cdf closely predicts the true cdf. Knowledge about the functional form of the
right tail of G(w) enables us to estimate the model even with the top-coded wage sam-
ple. Notice though, that the precision of the above prediction (hence the performance
Table 1.2: Estimated Parameters for the Pareto Tails
Sample 1988 Sample 1994
Coeff. (Std.Error) Coeff. (Std.Error)
α 19978.81 (106.35) 26638.20 (125.20)
β 5.0336 (0.0658) 4.9645 (0.0588)
R2 0.9740 0.9793
Obs. 236 241
Range [28424, 32159] [37620, 41995]
Range
Total Range 0.167 0.151
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of the proposed method) depends on the degree of right-censoring in the data: the
higher it is the less accurate will be the resulting estimates.
1.5.2 Structural Parameters
Next we estimate the model specified in (1.8)-(1.9). Whenever wage observations are
top-coded we use (1.15)-(1.16) where P(w) is determined by the Pareto parameters
from Table 1.2. If the wages are observed but still belong to the interval on which Pareto
distribution consistently estimates earnings distribution we use (1.8)-(1.9) inserting
ρ
(
w|α̂, β̂
)
and P
(
w|α̂, β̂
)
instead of ĝ(w) and Ĝ(w).
For convenience of inference in Table 1.3 we rather report the reciprocals of the
estimated parameters. Consider first the unemployed agents. Following Mortensen
and Neumann (1988) mean unemployment duration is just a reciprocal hazard of exit
from unemployment, i.e. λ−10 . From Table 1.3 we see that the expected length of
unemployment did not significantly change during the analyzed period of time. For
the individuals sampled in 1998 it was at the level of about two years. In the sample
drawn at 1994 it has kept remaining to be so. The expected length of the unemployment
duration is quite in line with the sample measures (see Table 1.1; keep in mind that
sample information is downward biased because of incomplete durations). At the same
time the unemployment rates predicted by the model overestimate the observed ones.
Inserting λ̂0 and δ̂ into (1.2) one obtains the unemployment rates of 15.5% for 1988
and 17.3% for 1994 which is too high in comparison to the sample counterparts of
8.6% and 9.8% respectively. This misfit is an evidence of either underestimated λ0 or
overestimated δ. Though, as we have shown above the estimated λ0 quite accurately
predicts the mean unemployment duration. So the most likely reason is a not rich
enough specification of quit behaviour. Going back to the formulation of the likelihood
function one can recall that we have only two states in the model, i.e. only employed
and unemployed individuals are sampled. However, there also exist the working-age
non-participants. Even though we do not include them into the sample we can later
observe the transitions from job and unemployment to non-participation. Since we
don’t have “non-participation” as state such spells are censored at the exit date. If
we had had one, however, the spell would have been complete and we would have also
known the quit probability to non-participation. This probability, like both πj→j and
πj→u obviously depends on the quit rate δ, which would enrich specification of this
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parameter and most likely improve the fit of the model. To our knowledge, so far there
were almost no applications that would move in this direction. The only known to
us paper with non-participation as an additional state is that of Bowlus and Grogan
(2001). Their estimation method, however, is not the nonparametric one. Furthermore,
even if it was, there would be no straightforward way to compare the estimates because
the model with two states is not nested in the three-state specification, but rather is a
degenerate case of the latter with zero probability mass put on the non-participation.
Our intuition is that certain selection bias would still exist.
Inference about expected employment durations predicted by the model is less
straightforward. By the same argument of Mortensen and Neumann (1988) expected
job duration equals to the reciprocal hazard of exit to a better job, which is [λ1F̄ (w)]
−1.
In other words calculation of the expected job duration predicted by the model pre-
sumes the knowledge of the wage offer distribution. Even though it is possible to
estimate the offer distribution in this setting (see Figures A.1-2 of the Appendix), so
far all the inference in the existing literature was based only on the reciprocal employed
search intensity λ−11 . In the present application we rather consider [λ1F̄ (wi)]
−1. In this
way we provide more comprehensive description of the expected employment duration
linking it to the promotion prospects of the agent. To make the estimated expected
durations comparable across time we evaluate F̄ (wi) at the average wages of the re-
spective deciles of the earnings distribution. Visual presentation of our results is given
in Figure A.3 of the Appendix.
First we notice that expected job duration of agents, whose earnings belong to
the upper two deciles, exceeds potential job tenure (more than 50 years). This result
is, however, quite natural, since it tells that people who earn very high income lose
pecuniary incentives to search for a better job and are happy to stick to their current
job forever. Considering the results for the rest of the workers we see that, like in
the unemployment case, no significant changes occurred to the predicted durations. In
Figure A.3, be it sample of 1988 or 1994, the expected job durations of one year do
not fall out of the confidence bounds for another one. Thus we do not find support to
Mayrhuber and Url (1998), who indicate significant upward shifts in job mobility. On
one hand our analysis is more comprehensive, since we explicitly take the promotion
prospects into account. On the other hand, as we have noticed above, the two-state
model estimated in this chapter may be too restrictive to provide the precise fit to the
available data.
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Table 1.3: Estimated Frictional Parameters ∗
Sample 1988 Sample 1994
1/λ0 25.8792 (1.1305) 26.7293 (1.0003)
[22.9610, 28.4108] [24.3911, 29.4752]
1/λ1 32.9377 (1.5851) 35.7950 (1.7150)
[29.2327, 36.1881] [32.3762, 40.0264]
1/δ 138.6262 (3.1019) 127.8525 (2.6710)
[130.7908, 145.0097] [122.6721, 134.7831]
log(Likelihood) −43386.396 −51654.443
∗ Standard errors in parenthesis; bootstrap 95% confidence intervals
in square brackets (200 replications)
To describe firms’ behaviour we use the following tools. Firstly, it is the index of
monopsony power, which is defined by Bontemps et al. (2000) as
MPI = (p−K(p)) /p
Secondly, using (1.4), (1.5) and some algebra, we derive a profit ratio
π∗
π
=
M∗/N∗
M/N
p∗ − w∗
Iw (p− w)
[
λ∗0(δ0 + κ0)
λ0(δ
∗ + κ∗0)
(δ∗ + λ∗1)(δ + λ1F̄ (w))
(δ + λ1)(δ
∗ + λ∗1F̄ ∗(w∗))
]
in which π∗ and π are the profits at the two different periods of time. To make the
productivity-wage differences comparable the denominator is scaled by the index of
agreed minimum wages Iw; M/N stands for total labour force over the number of
active firms.3
Figure A.4 presents the plot of the monopsony power indices for 1988 and 1994 (in
comparable scale). In Figure A.5 one can see that plot of the ratio of profits in 1994
3Henceforward we assume that [M∗/N∗] / [M/N ] = 1.
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to profits in 1988 evaluated for the average productivity value of every decile of the
productivity distribution. An interesting observation can be made here. First of all we
see that the monopsony power has slightly gone down. This would imply that the firms
became weaker in exploiting search frictions and their profits should therefore reduce.
The same fact would be told by the graphs of the offer densities and distributions. As
one can see from Figures A.1-2 the shape of the wage offer has changed towards posting
higher wages more frequently, which ceteris paribus should also imply a reduction in
the equilibrium profits of the firms. However, inspecting Figure A.5 we find out that
for the majority of the firms (loosely speaking the core from the 2nd to 9th deciles of
the productivity distribution) profits did not alter considerably. Provided that M/N
did not change this fact can be be explained by the increase in the productivity of the
firms which was large enough to cover the partial loss of monopsony power and offer
higher wages keeping the profits relatively intact.
It is also worth noticing that the profits of the lowest-productive firms went up and
the profits of the highest productive firms went down considerably. This has also quite
an intuitive explanation once we look at Figure A.2 and recall (1.6), which tells that
in the model with continuous productivity dispersion the shapes of F (w) and Γ(p) are
identical. The rightward shift of F (w) hence Γ(p) implies that the number of low-
productive firms has reduced and the number of high-productive firms has increased.
This has reduced competition among employers at the bottom of Γ(p) and intensified
competition on its’ top. Exactly this fact is conveyed by the profit ratio plot at the
leftmost and the rightmost of the support of Γ(p).
1.5.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Some earlier contributions to the estimation of search equilibrium models with het-
erogeneous demand side were attempting to specify the productivity distribution as
a member of a certain parametric family. Koning et al. (1995) estimate the basic
Burdett-Mortensen model assuming that productivity parameter in the equilibrium
wage offer distribution is distributed log-normally. Christensen et al. (2000) use the
same framework with the only difference that the productivity parameter in their spec-
ification is multiplied by a dispersion factor exponent of which has normal distribution
with zero mean and unknown variance. However, from the Botnemps et al. (2000) dis-
cussion of the properties of the equilibrium productivity distribution it turns out that
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Table 1.4: Goodness of Fit Tests for the Wage Offer Distribution
Distribution under H 0 Test Minimum Test Statistic 5% Cr.Value
Sample 1988 Sample 1994
Pareto: Kolmogorov-D 1.4635 2.5273 1.2240
Kuiper 2.6864 5.0382 1.7470
Log-Normal: Kolmogorov-D 5.0417 4.5024 1.2240
Kuiper 7.2385 6.1587 1.7470
only a limited class of known parametric families can meet the conditions determined
by the equilibrium solution of the model (see Bontemps et al. 2000, Proposition 8).
Namely, the authors state that the right tail of the appropriate productivity density
should converge to zero slower then p−3, which invalidates application of the log-normal
distribution for p. At the same time Bontemps et al. (2000) notice that the family of
Pareto distributions meets this convergence criterion. The purpose of this concluding
subsection is to perform the analysis of the robustness of the estimation results to
parametric assumptions on the productivity distribution.
For the sensitivity analysis it will be more convenient to consider F (w) rather than
Γ(p). In what follows we take the estimates of F̂ (w) obtained from (1.3a) and compare
them with the distribution function from a known parametric family. Specifically, we
test the equivalence of F̂ (w) to log-normal and Pareto distribution.
In our analysis we use Kolmogorov-D
D (x) = max
{x}
(|F ∗(x)− F0(x|θ)|) (1.17)
and Kuiper
V (x) = max
{x}
(F ∗(x)− F0(x|θ)) + max{x} (F0(x|θ)− F
∗(x)) (1.18)
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tests for equivalence of two distributions. In both above statistics F ∗(x) stands for the
nonparametric estimate of the distribution of x and F0(x|θ) stands for the parametric
form of this distribution under null (see Stephens, 1974, for the overview and tabulated
critical values).
With both (1.17) and (1.18) we minimize the test statistics with respect to θ and
check whether the obtained minimum is less then the critical value for the test. In case
it is we conclude that there exists a subset of the parameter space of F0(w) on which this
distribution and the predicted F̂ (w) are statistically equivalent. This would imply that
imposing functional form assumptions on the offer(productivity) distribution should
not result into a misspecified model. In case the minimum exceeds the critical value, we
conclude that imposing parametric assumptions on the offer(productivity) distribution
must lead to the inconsistent estimates of the parameters of the model.
The results of the analysis are presented in Table 1.4. We find that in both samples
Pareto and log-normal specifications are rejected in favor of the nonparametric alter-
native. Firstly this finding supports the tail behavior result of Bontemps et al (2000)
that rules out the log-normal family. Secondly, we demonstrate that even assuming the
theoretically admissible Pareto family we cannot guarantee satisfactory performance
of the parametric estimation of the model. Interesting enough, Bontemps et al (2000)
also mention this fact with their data.
To cut it short, our analysis demonstrates that arbitrary parametric assumptions
on the productivity distribution lead to inconsistent estimates. So the nonparametric
estimation method should rather be applied. From this perspective the suggested in
this chapter method of dealing with top-coded wages using the nonparametric 3-step
method can be especially important.
1.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we consider a problem of non-parametric estimation of the search equi-
librium model with continuous productivity dispersion in the situation when individual
earnings information is top-coded. To facilitate estimation of the structural parame-
ters from the right-censored earnings samples we use the Pareto power law property
of the earnings distribution and formulate a simple amendment to the specification
of the model. Our formulation also preserves such attractive features of the original
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specification as fast convergence and simplicity of implementation.
To analyze the performance of the suggested method we estimate the model from
the two samples of employment history data drawn from the Austrian Social Security
records. It turns out that in moderately censored samples (top coded earnings make
about 10% of the total number of observations) local linear regression indeed provides
a very close fit of the Pareto functional form to the partially observed right tail of the
earnings distribution.
At the same time the estimates of the separation rate imply that the standard
formulation of the model with only two states of the market might be too restrictive.
Additionally we investigate whether non-parametric inference could be successfully
substituted by the one with ad hoc parametric assumptions. In our application it turns
out that neither log-normal nor Pareto distribution is a good enough proxy for the un-
observed productivity distribution. This implies that arbitrary parametric assumptions
may most likely lead to the inconsistent estimates of the structural parameters.
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Chapter 2
Discrete vs. Continuous
Productivity Dispersion
2.1 Introduction
As discussed in the previous chapter, nonparametric estimation of the Burdett-Mortensen
type of search equilibrium models has a number of advantages over the parametric one.
However, once we considering endogenous productivity distributions, in order to per-
form the nonparametric estimation the continuous productivity distribution must be
assumed. In contrast, a fully parametric approach relies on the finite number of pro-
ductivity types in the economy. This difference becomes important once we address
the specification of the econometric model.
Bontemps et al. (2000), when developing their nonparametric method, notice that
it assures the consistent estimates of the parameters of interest only when the model
predicts the proper productivity distribution. Since theoretically it was not possible to
exclude the cases in which the implied productivity density can take negative values,
Bontemps et al. (2000) derive the appropriate restriction that would provide a properly
estimated density. In this chapter we demonstrate that there are situations in which
there exist no positive arrival rate of wage offer to the employed worker, which can
satisfy mentioned restriction and avoid the nonnegativity of the productivity density.
This implies that the procedure of Bontemps et al. (2000) breaks down and one
needs to search for an alternative approach to estimate the model. We also develop
a simple data-driven condition which can in advance tell about the applicability of
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the nonparametric method. Reviewing the alternative method of Bowlus et (2001)
we find that assuming the discrete productivity dispersion does not suffer from the
specification failures of the considered art, which makes it eventually a substitute for
the inapplicable first best. Our analysis is applied to learning about the influence of
the extension of the entitlement to the UI benefits on the subsequent dynamics of
unemployment rates among old and unskilled workers in West Germany.
Generous unemployment insurance benefit is one potential reason for the high level
of unemployment in European economies. Nickell (1997) and Siebert (1997) provide
evidence for this hypothesis. Furthermore, Nickell (1997) and Nickell and Layard (1999)
demonstrate that there exists a positive dependence between long-lasting entitlements
to unemployment benefit and long-term unemployment. The German labour market is
a typical representative of the above pattern. Evidence for this is presented for instance
in Hunt (1995) or Steiner (1997) who, in a reduced form estimation of a duration
model, show that the increasing length of unemployment duration is associated with
an increase in the entitlement.
The time profile of the west German unemployment rates shows some well-known
and interesting features: from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s the unemployment rate
of low-skilled and old-age workers was rising faster than that of the other skill or
age groups. Relatively high unemployment rates of low-skilled workers are not only a
German phenomenon, but they are particularly high in Germany. Nickell and Layard
(1999) present figures of the unemployment rates of low and highly educated male
workers for ten OECD countries from the 1970s to the early 1990s: from 1983 to 1986,
the unemployment rate of low skilled workers relative to the total unemployment rate
was 2.2 in West Germany For the other countries the ratio ranged from 0.6 to about
1.8, and the average was about 1.4. Moreover, until 1991 to 1993, for Germany this
ratio rose by about 18%, while in the other countries the increase was lower. For
elder workers, figures from the OECD Employment Outlook (1996) on standardized
unemployment rates show that the West German situation substantially differs from
that of many large economies. For instance, in 1983 in France, Italy, Spain, and the
US the ratio of the unemployment rate of workers from 55 to 64 years old to the total
unemployment rate was below one. Until the year 1990 it rose only for Spain. In
contrast, for West Germany this ratio was about 1.16 in 1983 and more than doubled
by 1990 demonstrating again the highest value and the sharpest increase.
There may exist quite a number of reasons why by the mid 90s unemployment
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of unskilled and elder workers in West Germany was increasing. In this chapter we
concentrate on the entitlement length, which we consider especially important. In the
mid 80s the government has introduced a series of reforms aimed at raising the length
of entitlement to unemployment insurance benefits. Additionally, the increase in the
entitlement length was the highest for elder unemployed individuals. We expect that
as a result of these reforms reemployment incentives among elder unemployed workers
have significantly gone down. Furthermore, the reforms may have had particularly
strong adverse effect on the searching incentives of low-skilled unemployed workers.
Considerations of this type are not unfamiliar in the literature that documents the
German labour market. For instance, Sinn (2002) argues that changes in the unem-
ployment benefit system can potentially have an adverse effect on the incentives of low
skilled workers, because typically such workers work for low wages. For elder work-
ers, longer entitlement to unemployment benefit could be interpreted as a de facto
reduction of the (early) retirement age.
In the present application we try to investigate empirically the impact of the in-
creased length of entitlement to unemployment benefits on the unemployment rates of
low-skilled and elder workers in West Germany. To do so we study the arrival rates
of job offers and exit rates from full-time employment into unemployment in the mid
1980s and mid 1990s for different skill and age groups. We choose as a framework for
the analysis the Burdett-Mortensen model, because through the adjustment of indi-
vidual search behavior it enables us establishing the link between the increase in the
entitlement duration and the dynamics of unemployment rates.
The setting of the theoretical model estimated in this chapter is similar to the one
briefly reviewed in Chapter 1. So here we will not make any additional introduction to
the theory (for an extensive treatment of the theory interested readers are referred to
Burdett and Mortensen, 1998, Mortensen, 1990, and Bontemps et al., 2000). At the
same time this chapter will provide the detailed analysis of the two existing structural
estimation methods and discuss the instances when the more attractive nonparametric
procedure of Bontemps et al. (2000) cannot not be applicable.
The second chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 motivates our study. Here
we describe the evolution of unemployment rates in West Germany for different skill
and age groups. We also provide a number of potential explanations of such a pattern
of unemployment outcomes. In Section 2.3 we present an overview of the theoreti-
cal results from the search equilibrium modelling and develop an argument that links
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the entitlement reforms with the unemployment rate dynamics. Section 2.4 discusses
the data. Methodological questions on the estimation of empirical search equilibrium
models are discussed in Section 2.5. Here we demonstrate the limitation of the non-
parametric method of Bontemps at al. (2000) and review the alternative procedure.
We also discuss some further inference-related issues. Section 2.6 presents our estima-
tion results and discusses their main economic implications. Summary and conclusions
are given in Section 2.7.
2.2 Unemployment Rates in West Germany
Already in the 1980s unemployment rates of unskilled and elder workers were partic-
ularly high relative to the overall unemployment rate. Moreover they kept rising con-
siderably starting from the early 1990s. The figures below illustrate this phenomenon.
Figure 2.1 shows the unemployment rates of four different skill-groups relative to the
overall unemployment rate for each gender. Figure 2.2 repeats this exercise for different
age groups. These figures were computed using data from the German Socio-economic
Panel (GSOEP). The samples are limited to workers who are 16 to 64 years old. As
to qualification, the GSOEP categorizes workers according to “International Standard
Classification of Education” (ISCED) code, which takes into account both general
schooling and occupational qualifications. We discern four such groups: 1 - inade-
quately trained or with general elementary schooling, 2 - middle vocational training, 3
- vocational training and college entrance exam or higher vocational training and 4 -
higher education.
Figure 2.1(a) demonstrates that for skill-group 1 male unemployment rate is far
above the average unemployment rate in the economy. Since 1988 it is most of the time
about twice as high as the average male unemployment rate. Figure 2.1(b) displays
relative unemployment rates for women. Its striking feature is again the unemployment
rate in the lowest skill group. From 1985 to 1991 it exceeds the overall unemployment
rate by roughly 13 up to 34%. After 1991 the differences start increasing and eventu-
ally become much higher then in the earlier period, ranging from 22 to about 130 %.
In the skill group 2 there are most of the time no remarkable difference between the
group-specific and economy wide unemployment rate for both males and females. The
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Figure 2.1: Relative Unemployment Rates by Skill Groups
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Figure 2.2: Relative Unemployment Rates by Age Groups
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unemployment rates of the two highest skill groups are usually somewhat lower (and
occasionally considerably lower) than those of the entire economy. To sum up, Figure
2.1 demonstrates that unemployment rates of the unskilled workers are the highest
among all other skill groups and for women their relative deviation from the economy-
wide unemployment rate has become particularly high in the 1990s.
The evolution of such skill-based differences in the West German unemployment
rates is also highlighted by Sinn (2002) who points out that high unemployment rates
of the unskilled could reflect adverse effects of changes in benefits. Indeed, the standard
argument that increased benefit levels may raise the reservation wage and/or decrease
job search intensity and therefore induce a higher level of unemployment, may apply.
And this can be especially important for the low-skilled unemployed workers, whose
potential earnings are relatively close to the benefits that they receive. However, in
the period under review the replacement rates of the German unemployment benefit
system were not increased. So this can hardly explain why unemployment rates of
the low-skilled rose considerably from the 1980s to the mid 1990s. At the same time,
as we will discuss in more detail below, in the mid 1990s for some groups of workers
unemployment insurance benefits were paid for a much longer period of time. So it
might have rather been an increase in the entitlement period that could have adversely
affected the unemployment rates of low-skilled workers.
Let us consider now the age dimension. Figure 2.2 tracks the unemployment rates
for several age groups of workers relative to the total unemployment rate. The most
important detail of this plot is the evolution of the unemployment rate of the eldest
group. Looking at Figure 2.2(a) in the year 1985 unemployment rate of the eldest
males is still relatively close to the aggregate male unemployment rate. But from 1986
to 1989 it exceeds the aggregate unemployment rate by about 46 to 74%. From 1995 to
2001, this relative difference ranged even from 79 and 167%. The unemployment rates
of all other age groups deviate much less from the aggregate rate. The corresponding
relative unemployment rates for women are shown in Figure 2.2(b). The evidence on
the eldest workers is not exactly the same as for men. Still, the figure shows that the
unemployment rate of those who are 54 to 64 years old tends to exceed the aggregate
unemployment rate in the second half of the 1980s and the first half the 1990s. And its
deviation from the overall unemployment rate becomes remarkable since about 1992.
Sometimes the unemployment rate in this group is even more than twice as high as the
overall unemployment rate of all females.
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In Germany two important institutional changes may have contributed to the in-
crease in the relative unemployment rates of the eldest workers. First of all over the
1980s several benefit reforms tended to raise the potential length of the unemployment
insurance (UI) benefits. Table 2.1 shows the length of UI benefit receipt over several
time periods.
We start with the year 1985, as we will analyze the period from the mid 80s until
the year 2000. The length of UI receipt depends positively on work-history in insured
employment in the seven years prior to the benefit claim. The first column of Table
2.1 shows the relevant work-history intervals in months. The effect of additional work-
history on the UI entitlement length also depends on age-limits.1 These age-limits are
shown in brackets next to the entitlement lengths in the other columns of the Table 2.1.
The table shows the rules for the entitlement lengths, which are measured in months,
that were in force in the year 1985 (second column), from January 1986 to March 1987
(third column), from April 1987 to March 1997 (fourth column) and from April 1997
to December 2003 (fifth column). We also notice that due to some special exemptions
the rules displayed by the last column fully affected unemployed workers only two years
after their introduction (see Wolff, 2003, for details).
Table 2.1 demonstrates that except of the last reform, all benefit reforms were
raising the length of UI entitlement. One can also see that this increase was usually
limited to certain age-groups and that the reforms were making the benefit system
more and more generous for elder workers. With a sufficient work-history, unemployed
workers older than 54 from July 1987 to March 1997 could be entitled to UI benefits
for up to 32 months, while it was only 24 months from January 1986 to June 1987 and
18 months in the year 1985. For workers younger than 42 years to the contrary, the
maximum length of UI entitlement was never raised in the 1980s and they could never
receive UI for more than 12 months. However, the amount of work-history to achieve
this maximum was reduced from 36 in 1985 to 24 by March 1987.
Along with the eldest workers, the reforms of the late eighties have stretched out the
1Note that unemployed people who run out of their UI benefit may still receive unemployment
assistance benefit (UA). UA is generally lower than UI benefit and is not time limited. It can be paid
until people reach the regular retirement age. Before 1994 the formal replacement rates of the UA
benefit were 58 % for parents and 56 % for childless people, while for UI they were 68 % and 63 %,
respectively. In 1994 these replacement rates were cut for UA benefit to 57 % and 53 % and for UI
benefit to 67 % and 60 %. However, the UA benefit is means-tested and the benefit level may hence
by far lower than the formal replacement rates suggest.
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Table 2.1: Entitlement Length of Unemployment Insurance Benefit
Work History Length of UI entitlement during specific periods
(months) January 1985 to January 1986 to July 1987 to April 1997 to
December 1985 June 1987 March 1997 December 2003
12 − 15 4 4 6 6
16 − 17 4 4 8 8
18 − 19 6 6 8 8
20 − 23 6 6 10 10
24 − 27 8 8 12 12
28 − 29 8 8 14 (age ≥ 42) 14 (age ≥ 45)
30 − 31 10 10 14 (age ≥ 42) 14 (age ≥ 45)
32 − 35 10 10 16 (age ≥ 42) 16 (age ≥ 45)
36 − 39 12 12 18 (age ≥ 42) 18 (age ≥ 45)
40 − 41 12 12 20 (age ≥ 44) 20 (age ≥ 47)
42 − 43 14 (age ≥ 49) 14 (age ≥ 44) 20 (age ≥ 44) 20 (age ≥ 47)
44 − 47 14 (age ≥ 49) 14 (age ≥ 44) 22 (age ≥ 44) 22 (age ≥ 47)
48 − 51 16 (age ≥ 49) 16 (age ≥ 44) 24 (age ≥ 49) 24 (age ≥ 52)
52 − 53 16 (age ≥ 49) 16 (age ≥ 44) 26 (age ≥ 49) 26 (age ≥ 52)
54 − 55 18 (age ≥ 49) 18 (age ≥ 49) 26 (age ≥ 49) 26 (age ≥ 52)
56 − 59 18 (age ≥ 49) 18 (age ≥ 49) 28 (age ≥ 54) 28 (age ≥ 57)
60 − 63 18 (age ≥ 49) 20 (age ≥ 49) 30 (age ≥ 54) 30 (age ≥ 57)
64 − 65 18 (age ≥ 49) 20 (age ≥ 49) 32 (age ≥ 54) 32 (age ≥ 57)
66 − 71 18 (age ≥ 49) 22 (age ≥ 54) 32 (age ≥ 54) 32 (age ≥ 57)
≥ 72 18 (age ≥ 49) 24 (age ≥ 54) 32 (age ≥ 54) 32 (age ≥ 57)
maximum entitlement lengths for the 42 to 53 years old individuals. But the increase
for those older then 54 was still higher. As a result the incentives to actively search for
a job have gone down particularly for the eldest workers.
On top of that UI recipients older than 54 were always facing additional disincentive
to search for a job. Namely, this is an option of exit into early retirement at the age of
60. To qualify for early retirement one must have at least 12 months of unemployment
in the 18 months prior to reaching this age limit (see Lampert, 1996, p.267). For workers
near sixty, this type of early retirement together with the high length of UI entitlement
could be an additional disincentive to search actively for a job. Finally, since the reform
of the Employment Promotion Act in 1986, unemployed workers older than 57 could
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agree with the labour offices to enter early retirement at the earliest possible date (see
Steffen, 2003). In turn they need not be (fully) available for suitable job offers. This
has pushed the disincentives for elder workers further up and paved the way into early
retirement within the two years prior to reaching the age limit of 60 years. Even though
elder workers are highly protected against dismissal, in practice these rules made their
dismissal for both the employer and the employee more attractive. Arnds and Bonin
(2002) argue that these reforms enabled employers to change the structure of their staff
towards younger workers. And apart from the unemployment benefit, dismissed elder
workers could even receive some additional financial support from their last employer.
Based on the overview above, for both unskilled and elder workers we ask one
and the same question. We are interested in how far the increase in the UI entitlement
length and the introduction of less strict requirements for getting the UI have influenced
the magnitude of the equilibrium unemployment rate of this workers. To answer this
question we need a theory that would link UI entitlement reform with equilibrium
unemployment rates. We consider such theory in the next section.
2.3 Necessary Theoretical Results
The Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model of search equilibrium formalizes strategic
interactions between supply and demand sides of the labour market. Representatives
of the supply side, i.e. workers, search for better jobs while representatives of the de-
mand side (employers) offer job opportunities. Workers maximize their utility of being
employed and employers maximize their profits. The model describes equilibrium flows
between the two states of the labour market, namely ”employment” and ”unemploy-
ment” by means of three key parameters: the arrival rate of a job offer to unemployed
worker, λ0, the arrival rate of a job offer to employed worker, λ1, and the arrival rate
of a match dissolution and return to unemployment, δ. The individual search process
in any of these two states is viewed as a repeated drawing of job offers from a certain
probability distribution, F (w), and acceptance or rejection of the offer after each draw.
Three components of the equilibrium solution of the Burdett-Mortensen are central
to the application of this chapter. First of all it is the steady state level of unemploy-
ment:
u =
δ
δ + λ0
. (2.1)
32
Secondly, it is the reservation wage of any unemployed agent who has an opportunity
cost of employment b
R = b + (λ0 − λ1)
∫ w
R
1− F (w)
δ + λ1 (1− F (w)) dw. (2.2)
In the economy with no black market work the parameter b in (2.2) reflects the level of
potential unemployment benefits. Additionally, Mortensen and Neumann (1988) argue
that in (2.2) the arrival rates of job offers, λ0 and λ1 can, without loss of generality, be
interpreted as search intensities of the participating workers. This interpretation will
be useful later on. Finally, Burdett and Mortensen (1998) show that whenever all the
employers are homogeneous with respect to their productivity, p, the equilibrium wage
offer distribution takes a form
F (w) =
δ + λ1
λ1
[
1−
√
p− w
p−R
]
(2.3)
One can further relax the assumption of employer homogeneity which will lead to
the wage offer distribution of a form F (w) =
∫
F (w|p)dΓ(p) where Γ(p) is a certain pro-
ductivity distribution that can be also derived endogenously. In his earlier contribution
Mortensen (1990) derives the theoretical wage offer distribution assuming that Γ(p) is
discrete. Bontemps et al. (2000) study the case where the productivity distribution is
continuous. In this chapter we estimate the model with both discrete and continuous
productivity distributions. Since we find that under the continuity assumption the
econometric model can be misspecified, we reserve the discussion of the issues related
to the functional form of the wage offer distribution for Section 2.5, where we treat the
structural econometric estimation of the model in detail.
We use (2.1)-(2.3) to link equilibrium unemployment rate, search intensity, reser-
vation wage and the extension of the entitlement to UI with each other.
Consider first (2.1). Differentiating u with respect to λ0 one can see that u is a
decreasing function of λ0. Ceteris paribus a reduction in search intensity of unemployed
workers leads to an increase in the equilibrium unemployment rate. The opposite is true
with respect to δ: A higher incidence of exit into unemployment raises the equilibrium
unemployment rate.
Next consider (2.2). After some algebra (2.2) can be represented as an implicit
function: G (R, λ0, λ1, δ, b) = 0. Simple application of the Implicit Function Theorem
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to G leads to a number of interesting results. Firstly one finds that for λ1 ∈ [δ, λ0) an
increase in b has positive impact on R and δ, negative for λ0 and ambiguous for λ1,
changing sign from positive to negative as λ1 goes from δ to λ0:
∂R
∂b
> 0,
∂λ0
∂b
< 0,
∂λ1
∂b
≷ 0, ∂δ
∂b
> 0, (2.4)
Secondly, adjustment behavior of workers to the entitlement reforms further influences
the reservation wage level. Again for λ1 ∈ [δ, λ0) it can be shown that:2
∂R
∂λ0
> 0,
∂R
∂λ1
≷ 0, ∂R
∂δ
< 0 (2.5)
The partial derivatives ∂R/∂λ0 and ∂R/∂λ1 have quite an intuitive interpretation.
They show that unemployed workers who search more actively, i.e have higher λ0,
must have higher reservation wages. Better prospects of promotion on the job reflected
by a high λ1 reduce the reservation wage and create an incentive to accept lower wages
in order to get out of unemployment faster (note that similarly to the previous chapter
each promotion on the job is treated as a job change). Poor promotion possibilities, i.e.
low λ1, increase R creating thus an additional incentive to stay longer in unemployment
and wait for better times.
The results above make it easy to show how increasing entitlement length would
influence the dynamics of unemployment rates. We would suggest the following argu-
ment. Even though it is not explicitly stated in (2.2) that considers only the current
benefit level and not its discounted present value, it is reasonable to suggest that an
increase in the duration of UI benefit payments induces an increase in the net present
value of unemployment. At the same time it is true that for any agent the search pro-
cess is associated with certain disutility generated by search efforts. Therefore, facing
the exogenous increase in the value of unemployment, unemployed agents will tend
to substitute certain degree of search intensity that brings disutility for some other
activities, i.e. search less. Considering (2.1) we conclude that this will unambiguously
shift the equilibrium unemployment rate up. This establishes the direct effect of the
2Even though the condition λ1 ∈ [δ, λ0) might seem to bee too restrictive, indeed it is not so. The
reason is that λ1 ≤ λ0 implies that expected job duration is at least as high as expected unemployment
duration. Furthermore λ1 ≥ δ implies that for employed workers with no job-to-job changes so far
the probability of finding the next job is at least as high as the probability of being fired. Thus, the
values of λ1 will typically lie in the interval [δ, λ0].
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extension on the unemployment rates.3
Along with a direct effect there can also exist an indirect one. One can expect that
the exogenous increase of the value of unemployment can make unemployed workers
choosy with respect to the arriving wage offers (van den Berg, 1990). This will be
reflected by the increasing reservation wage. At the same time, from (2.4)-(2.5) follows
that the just described reduction of unemployment search intensity will drive the reser-
vation wage down. This will counteract the initial exogenous increase in R. As a result
of the initial exogenous shock and subsequent unemployed search behavior adjustment
we will receive a new equilibrium level of the reservation wage. An interesting case
arises whenever this new level is higher then the one before the entitlement extension.
In this situation the low-productivity firms with limited capacities for productivity en-
hancement may offer too low a wage to attract any worker. This will result in a higher
degree of structural unemployment among lower-skilled workers.
Finally, the contribution to an increase in equilibrium unemployment rates may
come from the side of the match dissolution parameter δ. Even though in the model
this parameter is exogenous to the worker it still reflects some effects induced by a
longer duration of UI receipt. In particular, the increased generosity of the UI system
may increase the incentives to shirk and as a result drive the incidence of match breaks
up. From (2.1) we know that an increase in the frequency of match dissolution incidents
leads to the increase in the equilibrium unemployment rate.
The arguments presented above imply that by analyzing empirically the key pa-
rameters of the model before and after the reform we will be able to tell whether the
rise in UI entitlement length indeed contributed to the increase in unemployment rates
of unskilled and elder workers as discussed in the previous section. Even though the
reservation wage equation in the contemporary formulation of the model does not ex-
plicitly include the timing of UI payments, the available econometric procedures are
robust to this theoretical shortcoming (see Section 2.5, page 46). So we will be able
to avoid possible specification error in our structural estimation and find the estimates
that are consistent with the most general formalization of UI payment schedules that
3The logic of this argument also goes in line with the results of van den Berg (1990) who in a
simple job search model with time-limited UI payments demonstrates that ” ... any future shift in
the time path of exogenous variables that benefits the expected discounted lifetime income induces
job searchers to be more selective in their search process” (see van den Berg, 1990, p. 262). Even
though the model of van den Berg (1990) does not incorporate on-the-job search and quits it should
be expected that the discovered regularity would hold in the extended model as well.
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would consider the duration of benefit payments.
To conclude we notice that the effect of benefit reforms on the search behavior of
employed workers λ1 is unclear theoretically. In addition, empirical studies by Belzil
(1995), (2001) demonstrate that changes in the duration of benefit payments do not
significantly alter the length of subsequent reemployment spells. For these reasons, our
discussion will concentrate exclusively on the arrival rate of job offers for unemployed
individuals (λ0) and on the match dissolution parameter δ.
2.4 The Data
We use data from the German Socio-economic Panel – an annual longitudinal survey
of German households started at 1984. The information comes from the waves of
years 1984 to 2001. The analysis is restricted to samples A and B of the GSOEP.
Sample A represents households with a household head being a native West German.
Sample B represents households whose head belongs to main groups of foreigners in
west Germany. Additionally, we only include respondents from 16 to 64 years old.
2.4.1 Classification of Workers in the Stock Samples
Estimation of the empirical model of search equilibrium relies on stock sampling. We
analyze the stocks of employed and unemployed people from two specific waves: the
wave of the year 1986 and the wave of the year 1995. As the effect of the increase of
the potential length of UI benefit receipt started manifesting itself in-between, such a
sampling scheme should be the appropriate one for investigating the reaction in the
search behavior. The choice of years is also influenced by the fact that macroeconomic
conditions in these two years were rather similar, i.e. the economy was in roughly the
same phase of the cycle. Finally, this choice minimizes the amount of censored job and
unemployment durations in the samples under study.
For the reasons already spelled out in Section 1.3 we analyze the agents who are
“unemployed” and “full-time employed”. We classify workers as “unemployed” if for
the modal interview month of the chosen year they reported to be registered as unem-
ployed. For this classification, we use information from the subsequent wave’s retro-
spective labour force status calendarium. In contrast, we classify people as “full-time
employed” on the basis of their current labour force status reported at the interview.
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Unlike with the social security records data used in the previous chapter, GSOEP
always provides an information of whether an individual is a full-time or part-time
worker. This minimizes measurement error when estimating the endpoints of the sup-
port of the offer/earnings distribution (see Section 1.3 for the discussion).
2.4.2 Unemployment and Job Durations, Exit States
To construct the likelihood function for the model we need to use both wage and
duration data. Whenever we observe a change of states, we need to record information
about the new state. In the setting of the model, job-to-job changes are also considered
as a “change of state”.
Unemployment duration is calculated from the retrospective labour force status
calendarium of the GSOEP, in which respondents have to provide their labour force
status for every month of the previous calendar year. Apart form completed spells,
unemployment spells can also be left-censored, right-censored or both. In our sample,
unemployment spells are left-censored mainly because a respondent was already un-
employed before he/she first filled in the labour force status calendarium. The main
reasons for right-censoring is either that a respondent temporarily did not respond to
the GSOEP or due to the fact that the respondent completely dropped out of the panel
study. Finally, some of the spells did not terminate before the end of our observation
period.
The information on the beginning and end of a job spell is more difficult to ob-
tain. There are various pieces of information on the job history of individuals that
the GSOEP collects retrospectively. First of all respondents who state that they are
currently employed provide the calendar year and the calendar month of the start of
the job. Secondly, provided that there is a job change, employed respondents have
to state in which calendar month this job event took place and indicate the type of
job event: first job, new employer, self-employment, change within the firm, company
takeover, or return to work. Combining these two sources of information we restore
the calendar beginning and end of the jobs for all employed individuals.
Similar to unemployment spells, job spells can be left-censored, right-censored or
both and we proceed in similar fashion to the treatment of unemployment spells. Here
it would be insightful to point out one substantial difference between the household
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics of Event History Data for the Two Stock Samples ∗
1986 1995
Full Sample Elder Low-Skilled Full Sample Elder Low-Skilled
Number of individuals: 4873 [1.000] 571 [1.000] 1401 [1.000] 4030 [1.000] 637 [1.000] 933 [1.000]
Employed: 4551 [0.934] 518 [0.907] 1272 [0.908] 3681 [0.913] 533 [0.837] 780 [0.836]
Unemployed: 322 [0.066] 53 [0.093] 129 [0.092] 349 [0.087] 104 [0.163] 153 [0.164]
Employed Agents: 4551 [1.000] 518 [1.000] 1401 [1.000] 3681 [1.000] 533 [1.000] 780 [1.000]
Uncensored observations with:
job → job transition: 706 [0.155] 6 [0.012] 138 [0.108] 423 [0.114] 7 [0.013] 49 [0.063]
job → unemployment transition: 385 [0.085] 42 [0.081] 157 [0.123] 277 [0.075] 68 [0.128] 101 [0.129]
mean time spell between two states [job duration]: 139.95 248.94 150.53 106.82 248.33 129.35
(std. deviation): (115.44) (138.18) (113.66) (101.08) (141.28) (115.29)
Censored observations
a) left-censored durations only
with job → job transition: 97 [0.021] 5 [0.010] 24 [0.019] 22 [0.006] 1 [0.002] 3 [0.004]
with job → unemployment transition: 74 [0.016] 16 [0.031] 28 [0.022] 16 [0.004] 2 [0.004] 1 [0.001]
b) right-censored durations only: 2898 [0.637] 361 [0.697] 784 [0.616] 2857 [0.776] 445 [0.835] 603 [0.773]
c) both left- and right-censored durations: 391 [0.086] 88 [0.170] 141 [0.111] 86 [0.023] 10 [0.019] 23 [0.029]
Mean time spell [both uncensored and censored]: 168.85 236.69 158.99 155.05 263.87 161.88
(std. deviation): (136.41) (167.16) (123.92) (118.89) (143.26) (117.13)
Unemployed Agents: 322 [1.000] 53 [1.000] 129 [1.000] 349 [1.000] 104 [1.000] 153 [1.000]
Uncensored observations (u → j transition): 116 [0.360] 3 [0.057] 42 [0.326] 105 [0.301] 4 [0.038] 38 [0.248]
mean time spell between two states [job duration]: 14.18 11.67 14.91 20.81 14.50 19.92
(std. deviation): (18.94) (4.16) (12.57) (22.95) (8.66) (14.30)
Censored observations
a) left-censored durations (u → j transition) only: 14 [0.043] - 11 [0.085] 3 [0.009] - 1 [0.007]
b) right-censored durations only: 160 [0.497] 33 [0.623] 58 [0.450] 226 [0.648] 96 [0.923] 106 [0.693]
c) both left- and right-censored durations: 32 [0.099] 17 [0.321] 18 [0.140] 15 [0.043] 4 [0.038] 8 [0.052]
Mean time spell [both uncensored and censored]: 29.20 45.51 34.95 35.43 47.25 40.92
(std. deviation): (33.02) (37.02) (36.07) (33.35) (36.75) (36.25)
———–
∗ Duration data in Months. Share of the sample in square brackets.
survey data of this chapter and social security records data of the previous one. With
household surveys it happens that we may not observe the exact start or end of the job
spell even if it does not exceed the observation period. We may see only a year of the
job change, but not know the month. In this cases the elapsed(residual) duration is
taken to be the the smallest observed one and the spell is qualified as censored. Social
security records to the contrary always provide the exact timing of the spell.
For all spells where we could observe the calendar end, we determine the exit
state. In case of the unemployment spells, using the retrospective labour force status
calendarium information, we check whether they ended in full-time employment or
in any other labour force state. In case of the job spells, we use the labour force
status calendarium and job events information to see whether a job has ended by the
transition to unemployment, another job or non-participation.
Table 2.2 provides summary statistics for employment and unemployment spells in
the resulting stock samples. Additionally it shows the percentage of the spells that
are completed, left-, right- and both left- and right-censored. From Table 2.2 one
can again see how big the difference between the economy-wide unemployment rate
and unemployment rates of the unskilled and elder workers is. Moreover we see the
increasing difference: in 1986 the rates for these both groups were about 1.5 times bigger
than the total rate; in 1995 this gap widens and unemployment rates of the unskilled
and old workers become twice as big as the total rate. This fact was extensively
discussed in Section 2.2. Inspecting the data set it may also be interesting to compare
the West-German unemployment rates with the Austrian ones. From Table 1.1 in
Section 1.3 of the first Chapter we realize that the dynamics of unemployment rates in
a country with no entitlement reforms was by far not as drastic. Similar observation
can be made about the unemployment duration in Austria and Germany. Comparing
the duration lengths (both censored and uncensored spells) we see that generally in
Germany unemployment lasts longer.
2.4.3 Wages and Benefits
Wages: The final piece of information necessary for the estimation of the model is
earnings. We use the data on net wages provided by the GSOEP. Individuals who are
employed at their interview provide the monthly net wage in the month prior to the
interview. For the stock sample of job spells we use the wage information that the
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Figure 2.3: Kernel Estimates of Earnings Densities in 1986 and 1995
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respondents stated at the year for which the sample is drawn. For the stock sample
of unemployment spells we use the first reported wage after the end of unemployment,
provided that the unemployment spell is not right-censored. All wages are deflated by
the west German consumer price index to prices of 1998. Kernel estimates of earnings
densities are presented in Figure 2.3. (kernel plots account for tail correction of Vuong
et al., 2000, on both left and right tails).
Benefit Levels: Having once estimated the model we compute the reservation
wages predicted by the theory. To do this we need to know either the true benefit receipt
or a potential benefit level of our sample members. We consider three types of benefits:
unemployment insurance benefits (UI), unemployment assistance benefits (UA) and
welfare benefits (WB). UI and UA benefits are determined by formal replacement
rates. Though the UA and WB are means-tested and therefore may eventually be
lower than the formal replacement rates.
For unemployed people, we set the UI or UA benefit to the level that they received
at the date when the stock sample was drawn. These benefit levels are reported ret-
rospectively in the subsequent wave. The respondents provide the monthly average
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benefit level for the months in which they received the benefit during the previous cal-
endar year. There are also a few unemployed individuals in our sample who receive a
training benefit but no unemployment benefit. For all full-time employed individuals,
we set their unemployment benefit level to the value of the replacement rate of the UI
benefit multiplied by their net wage.
We did not attempt to simulate the means-test for the households in our sample
in order to compute a welfare benefit level. However, we used information on social
benefits provided by the household heads for the households in which the respondents
live. We took into account receipt of rent subsidy payments, continuous aid for living
expenses as well as social welfare assistance to meet special contingencies in life.
2.5 Structural Econometric Model
2.5.1 The Likelihood Function
The construction of the likelihood function is thoroughly considered in Chapter 1,
Section 1.4.1. Here we only show the result, rewriting it a bit differently for convenience
of the subsequent argument and estimation. Define κ0 = λ0/δ , κ1 = λ1/δ . Keeping the
conventional notation of F̄ (w) = 1−F (w) we get the following likelihood contributions
of unemployed (Lu) and employed (Le) individuals:
Lu = 1
1 + κ0
[δκ0]
2−dr−dl exp {−δκ0 [te + tr]} [f(w)]1−dr , (2.6)
Le = κ0g(w)
1 + κ0
[
δ
(
1 + κ1F̄ (w)
)]1−dl exp {−δ (1 + κ1F̄ (w)
)
[te + tr]
}×
[[
δκ1F̄ (w)
]dt
δ1−dt
]1−dr
(2.7)
In (2.6) and (2.7) dl = 1, if a spell is left-censored, 0 otherwise; dr = 1, if a spell is
right-censored, 0 otherwise; dt = 1 if there is a job-to-job transition, 0 otherwise. Since
all labor suppliers are assumed to act independently, the total likelihood is a product
of all individual contributions.
41
2.5.2 Nonparametric Estimation and Its Limitations
Define the observed earnings density and distribution as g(w) and G(w) respectively.
Then using the steady state identities of the theoretical Burdett-Mortensen model
F̄ (w) =
1−G(w)
1 + κ1G(w)
and f(w) =
(1 + κ1) g(w)
[1 + κ1G(w)]
2 (2.8)
Bontemps et al. (2000) propose the following 3-step estimation procedure. On the first
step g(w) and G(w) in (2.8) are estimated nonparametrically. On the second step the
expressions in (2.8) are substituted into (2.6) and (2.7) and the likelihood function is
maximized with respect to {κ0, κ1, δ}. On the third step the equilibrium productivity
levels
p = K−1(w) = w +
1 + κ1G(w)
2κ1g(w)
(2.9)
and productivity density
γ(p) =
2κ1(1 + κ1)g(w)
3
3κ1g(w)2[1 + κ1G(w)]2 − g′(w)[1 + κ1G(w)]3 (2.10)
are calculated. Bontemps et al. (2000) notice that the third step is possible only if
the model is well specified with respect to the equilibrium productivity distribution,
i.e., if 3κ1g(w)
2 − g′(w)[1 + κ1G(w)] > 0. In case this condition is not satisfied they
suggest to perform the second step of the procedure under this theoretically implied
constraint, which can be conveniently written down as
κ1
[
3g(w)2 − g′(w)G(w)] > g′(w) {w : g′(w) ≥ 0} .4 (2.11)
In the applications of the proposed methodology so far (see, for instance, Bontemps
et al., 2000) the constraint in (2.11) was never violated. The present application, to
the contrary, faces the opposite case. Therefore, we follow the suggestion of Bontemps
et al. (2000) and on the second step maximize the likelihood with respect to (2.11).
It turns out, however, that the constrained optimization may not always be feasible.
To see this notice that for some values of w the term 3g(w)2 − g′(w)G(w) on the l.h.s.
of (2.11) can be negative. This is exactly the case when we observe clusters of those
who earn very high wages. Such clustering is represented by a bump far on the right
4Notice that if g′(w) < 0 productivity density γ(p) is always positive.
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tail of the estimated earnings density. Whenever such a bump occurs, g′(w) is greater
than zero and at the same time G(w) → 1 and g(w) → 0. So the value of g(w) may be
too small to make the whole term 3g(w)2 − g′(w)G(w) positive. In this situation the
constraint yields
κ1 < min{w}
g′(w)
3g(w)2 − g′(w)G(w) < 0 {w : g
′(w) ≥ 0} (2.12)
As a result there is no κ1 that can satisfy (2.11), since κ1 is always greater than zero.
We will refer to this case as ”constraint inconsistency”.
In the opposite situation when 3g(w)2 − g′(w)G(w) > 0 the constraint becomes
κ1 > max{w}
g′(w)
3g(w)2 − g′(w)G(w) > 0 {w : g
′(w) ≥ 0} (2.13)
and constrained maximization on the second step indeed returns an appropriate esti-
mate of κ1. A typical example for this case will be the left tail of earnings distribu-
tion, where g(w) increases, but its values are high enough to ensure that 3g(w)2 −
g′(w)G(w) > 0 holds ∀w : g′(w) ≥ 0.
As we find that constraint inconsistency is purely the earnings data property, the
sign
[
3g(w)2 − g′(w)G(w)] (2.14)
on {w : g′(w) ≥ 0} becomes a simple criterion that would allow checking in advance
whether the nonparametric 3-step procedure is applicable.
In our application it turns out that for both data samples (2.14) is not uniformly
positive, i.e. we face the case of an inconsistent constraint. This implies that we
cannot apply the nonparametric estimation procedure directly. The regions of the tail
where (2.14) is negative can be actually seen on Figure 2.5. These are the peaks of the
“waves” to the right of about DM 7000.
Finally, we also warn from using oversmoothing of the kernel density estimator in
order to achieve the “consistent” constraint. By oversmoothing one can indeed get a
strictly decreasing right tail with minor changes of the curvature of the rest of estimated
density. However, from (2.13) it can be seen that by manipulating the magnitude of
the bandwidth one arbitrarily fixes the value of the lower bound of the constraint. This
inevitably biases the estimated κ̂1.
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2.5.3 Parametric Estimation of the Model
Facing the situation of constraint inconsistency we cannot perform the nonparametric
estimation of the model any longer. So we need to use the alternative parametric
procedures. In other words we have to impose certain assumptions concerning the
form of either the earnings or the productivity distribution.
Parametric Assumptions on the Earnings Distribution
The easiest way to avoid an inconsistent constraint is to assume some parametric form
for g(w) instead of using its nonparametric estimate in (2.6)-(2.7). Inspecting the shape
of the kernel estimate of the earnings distribution the most natural suggestion would
be that g(w) is log-normal. We estimate the model under this assumption and find
that indeed (2.11) is always satisfied. However, calculating (2.9) we discover that it
violates the requirement that the offered wage is a monotone increasing function of pro-
ductivity.5 This generates an improper estimated productivity density and implies the
necessity of imposing parametric assumptions on the productivity distribution directly.
Parametric Assumptions on the Productivity Distribution
This approach differs from the one in Section 2.5.2 by the fact that now the productivity
parameter p appears in the likelihood function explicitly. p emerges because instead of
nonparametric estimates of g(w), f(w) and F (w) we take the theoretical expressions
of these same functions. The theoretical offer and earnings distributions constitute
a part of the equilibrium solution of the model and depend on both search intensity
parameters and the productivity parameter p (see Mortensen, 1990, and Burdett and
Mortensen, 1998, for derivations).
If employers were identical, the theoretical offer distribution would be given in
(2.3). However, to get a decreasing right tail of the theoretical earnings density, we
must assume productivity differentials among employers. This would imply a certain
distribution for p.
In the literature there exist two approaches to estimation of the model with het-
erogeneous employers. The first one is taken by Koning et al. (1995) and Christensen
5Monotonicity of offered wages as a function of productivity follows from Proposition 10 of Bon-
temps et al. (1997), which is a generalization of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) finding that more
productive firms pay higher wages.
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et al. (2000). It is based on ad hoc assumptions about the shape of the productivity
distribution. Namely, Koning et al. (1995) assume that firms’ productivity is dis-
tributed lognormally with parameters µ and σ and consider the marginal likelihood,
where marginalization is made with respect to productivity. The likelihood function
is maximized with respect to {κ0, κ1, δ, µ, σ}. Christensen et al. (2000) rather suggest
that the unknown productivity parameter p is multiplied by the term exp{η}, where
η ∼ N(0, σ2). The likelihood function in their application is maximized with respect
to {κ0, κ1, δ, p, σ}. However, despite assuming the continuous productivity distribution
both these contributions ignore the result
F (w) = Γ(p)
stated later by Bontemps et al. (2000). In addition to that, in Chapter 1 we have shown
that arbitrary assumptions on the productivity distribution may lead to inconsistently
estimated structural parameters (see Section 1.5.3). Therefore this approach can hardly
be attractive.
The second approach to the specification of the productivity distribution is due to
Bowlus et al. (1995), (2001). It assumes that the productivity distribution is discrete
rather then continuous. The exact form of the distribution is a priori unknown and
the support points and corresponding probability mass values are estimated together
with the structural parameters of the model. Furthermore Bowlus et al. (1995), (2001)
take into account the theoretical dependence between the continuous offer distribution
and the discrete productivity distribution (see 2.16 below) and, unlike Koning et al.
(1995) and Christensen et al. (2000), consider a completely specified structural model.
These positive features of the second approach makes it an attractive choice for our
present application.
The specification relies on the closed form solution for the wage offer distribution
derived by Mortensen (1990). Mortensen (1990) shows that whenever the productivity
distribution is discrete and has Q points of support the theoretical wage offer distri-
bution has Q kinks, each of them corresponding to the highest wage paid by a pj-type
employer (j = 1, ..., Q). Moreover, firms with higher productivity pay higher wages,
which implies that the lowest wage paid by pj-type employer (wLj) is equal to the
highest wage of pj−1 -type employer (wHj−1). Consequently the ranking wHj−1 < wHj
∀j = 1, ..., Q applies. This leads to the theoretical wage offer distribution with Q
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distinct productivity types
F (w) =
1 + κ1
κ1
[
1− 1 + κ1
(
1− γj−1
)
1 + κ1
√
pj − w
pj − wHj−1
]
, w ∈ (wLj , wHj ] (2.15)
j = 1, ..., Q, (wL1 = R, wHQ = w). In the expression above γj indicates the fraction of
employers with productivity level pj or less (γ0 = 0, γQ = 1). From the fact that more
productive firms pay higher wages Mortensen (1990) concludes that
F (wHj) = γj (2.16)
Bowlus et al. (1995) use (2.15) and (2.16) to formulate their estimation procedure.
First, differentiating (2.15) with respect to w and using (2.8) Bowlus et al. (1995) get
the theoretical wage offer and earnings densities
f(w) =
1 + κ1
(
1− γj−1
)
2κ1
1√
pj − w
√
pj − wHj−1
, (2.17)
g(w) =
1 + κ1
2κ1
(
1 + κ1
(
1− γj−1
)) 1
pj − w
√
pj − wHj−1
pj − w (2.18)
w ∈ (wLj , wHj ], j = 1, ..., Q. Substitution of (2.15)-(2.18) into (2.6)-(2.7) gives the like-
lihood function with unknown parameters
{
κ0, κ1, δ, γ1, ..., γQ−1, p1, ..., pQ, R, wH1 , ...,
wHQ−1 , w
}
. Next, following Mortensen (1990) the productivity level is represented as
a function of cutoff wages wHj , probability mass points γj and structural parameters
pj =
wHj −BjwHj−1
1−Bj , (2.19)
where Bj =
[
1+κ1(1−γj)
1+κ1(1−γj−1)
]2
and (2.19) is substituted into (2.15), (2.17) and (2.18).
After this Bowlus et al. (1995) consider the subsets θ1 = {R, w}, θ2 =
{
wH1 , ..., wHQ−1
}
and θ3 = {κ0, κ1, δ} of the parameter space. Following Kiefer and Neumann (1993) as
an estimator of θ1 they suggest using the extreme order statistics of the observed wage
sample: θ̂1 = {wmin, wmax}.6 Then the estimation procedure is stepwise:
6This fact is especially useful for the present application, because the estimator R̂ = wmin allows
getting the consistent estimate of R even when the timing of UI benefit payments is not explicitly
introduced in the model
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1. On the first step given θ̂1 and starting values for {κ0, κ1, δ} and
{
γ1, ..., γQ−1
}
the set of cutoff wages θ2 is estimated;
2. On the second step given θ̂1, θ̂2 and starting values for {κ0, κ1, δ} and
{
γ1, ..., γQ−1
}
the likelihood function (2.6)-(2.7) is maximized with respect to θ3 = {κ0, κ1, δ};
3. Using θ̂3 and (2.8) and (2.16) the point mass probabilities γj are found and thy
cycle repeats again.
Since (2.15) has Q kinks in wHj the likelihood function is discontinuous in θ2 ={
wH1 , ..., wHQ−1
}
. To estimate the discontinuity points on the first step of the above
procedure Bowlus et al. (1995), (2001) suggest using the Simulated Annealing algo-
rithm as introduced by Kirkpatrick et al., 1983, (directions for implementation of the
algorithm can be found in Goffe et al., 1994). On the smooth second step the likelihood
is maximized by standard methods.
The number of elements in θ2, hence the number of mass points in Γ(pj), is treated as
unknown. We start from the homogeneous case (Q = 1) and add productivity levels one
by one. The exact distribution of the likelihood ratio in this particular case is also not
known. Bowlus et al. (2001) propose a quasi-LRT test V = −2 (log Lj−1 − log Lj) <
χ2(1). Performing a simulation study they notice, however, that this criterion can be
applied for small Q only, as the critical region increases with Q. Therefore we make
our choice of the number of mass points on the basis of information criteria (consistent
AIC, SBC).
Finally, we conclude with a short note on the covariance matrix estimator for the
structural parameters. Chernozhukov and Hong (2004) demonstrate that for a gen-
eral class of structural models in which discontinuity points of the likelihood func-
tion are not determined by the parameter subset θ̂3 asymptotic distribution of θ̂3 is√
n
(
θ̂3 − θ3.n
)
→ N(0, I−1), where I is the outer product of first derivatives of the
total likelihood with respect to θ3.
2.6 Estimation Results and Discussion
2.6.1 Preliminary Discussion
In Section 2.3 we argue that entitlement extension should negatively effect the search
intensity of the unemployed λ0 and increase the exit rate to unemployment δ. According
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to the theory both these changes must result in an upward shift of the equilibrium
unemployment rate. We also stipulate that the adjustment dynamics of search intensity
induced by the reforms may change the reservation wage level, which can contribute
to an increase in structural unemployment.
With respect to skills we expect that the increased generosity of the benefit sys-
tem will affect the arrival rates of job offers and reservation wages of the low skilled
workers more than those of the high skilled ones. One line of argument to support this
hypothesis is that the value of household production of skilled and unskilled workers is
about the same. At the same time the ratio of benefits plus value of household produc-
tion while unemployed to the potential wages plus the value of household production
while employed is much higher for the low-skilled than for the skilled workers. Thus
extending the entitlement length may affect the job search behavior of the low-skilled
workers more than that of skilled workers.7
Considering age groups, the increase in the potential duration of UI benefit receipt
is higher the older the workers are. So we expect that the search intensity of elder
workers must fall faster than that of younger workers, which will result into higher
group-specific unemployment rate. The opposite should be true for the reservations
wages.
We also have to notice that even though the comparison of reservation wages pre-
dicted by the model using (1.1) may provide us with rather useful results we have only
limited a possibility to interpret it. The reason is that the reservation wage calcula-
tion relies on a formula that contains the opportunity cost of employment b. We set
this quantity equal to the benefit level received by the agents. By doing so we do not
explicitly take into account other possible contributions to b such as household pro-
duction, black market work etc. In this way we may underestimate the magnitude of
the reservation wage. Furthermore, reservation wages predicted by means of (1.1) will
also ignore the actual change in the entitlement period. This shortcoming hampers
the inference about the possible contribution to the unemployment dynamics. Limited
possibilities to interpret the predicted reservation wages also prevents us from infer-
ring much from the changes in employed search intensity λ1. However, the latter fact
7One should note, though, that such differences may also be caused by other influences in the
labour market. For instance it could be a skill-biased technological change that could decrease the
relative demand for low-skilled workers. As a result we may expect a reduction in the arrival rate of
job offers to unskilled relative to skilled workers as well as an increase in their relative rate of job loss.
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can hardly be important for the inference, since we know that the dynamics λ1 is not
determined by the entitlement extension reforms (see Section 2.3).
2.6.2 Overall Fit of the Model
Let us first consider the estimation results for the whole economy.8 The model for the
whole economy is estimated primarily for analyzing its’ fit to the data. The estimation
results are presented in Table B.1. The procedure terminates at Q = 8 for the sample
of 1986 and Q = 10 for the data of 1995. The most appealing criterion of the goodness
of fit is the discrepancy between the predicted theoretical earnings distribution and
the nonparametric estimate of earnings distribution obtained from wage data. From
Figures B.1-2 we can see that for both 1986 and 1995 samples this fit is very close,
which should assure sound inference from the obtained estimation results. Furthermore,
the fit can be improved to an arbitrarily high degree by simply adding points to the
support of the productivity distribution. This, however, does not significantly change
the estimated parameters and does not improve the model any further in terms of
information criteria.
We can also compare the equilibrium unemployment rates predicted by the model
with actual unemployment rates reported in Table 2.2. Using (2.1) and the results
in Table B.1 we find that the model predicts unemployment rates of 7.3% and 9.7%
for 1986 and 1995 samples, respectively. From Table 2.2 we see that the share of
unemployed workers in 1986 and 1995 was 6.6% and 8.7% respectively. Again, this
reflects a fairly good fit of the estimated model to the data. So again we conclude that
the chosen model can provide reliable information for our subsequent analysis.
In what follows we estimate the model for different skill and age groups. As above,
the number of points of increase in the productivity distribution is treated as unknown.
We start with the homogeneous (Q = 1) model and, adding the support points one
by one, use information criteria to find the best specification. Estimation results for
skill groups are reported in Table B.2 and for age groups in Table B.3. Using the fact
that λi = κiδ (i = 0, 1) in Tables B.2-3 we report the results already in the form of
arrival rates of job offers. Our attention will be mainly focused on the results for the
least-skilled workers (Table B.2, group 1) and elder workers (Table B.3, group 4).
8We do not carry out the estimation separately for men and women. The reason is that when we
estimate the models for different skill or age groups, the gender-specific samples become too small.
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Table 2.3: Test Results for Search Intensities
H0 : χ2(1) p-Value
Skills λ(86)0 = λ
(95)
0 19.5996 0.0000
(Group 1) λ(86)1 = λ
(95)
1 16.4417 0.0000
δ(86) = δ(95) 16.9996 0.0000
Age λ(86)0 = λ
(95)
0 0.9781 0.3227
(Group 4) λ(86)1 = λ
(95)
1 0.1451 0.7033
δ(86) = δ(95) 15.1216 0.0001
2.6.3 Estimation Results by Skills
Table B.2 of the Appendix presents the estimation results for different skill groups in
both the year 1986 and 1994. The least skilled workers of group 1 are those who went
through an inadequate training or only general elementary education. We find that
the predicted equilibrium rate of unemployment in this group of workers goes up from
10.3% in 1986 to 15.1% in 1995. The results somewhat underpredict the true shift from
9.2% to 16.4% observed in the data (see Table 2.2). However, this underprediction is
minor. These results also demonstrate a considerable increase of the unemployment
rate of the low-skilled relative to those of all other skill groups, which matches the
empirical regularity presented in Figures 2.1-2.
Remembering that the equilibrium unemployment rate is found to be δ/(δ + λ0),
let us have a look at how λ0 and δ were changing over the observation period. For the
unemployed unskilled workers the arrival rate of job offers fell from 0.0373 to 0.0273,
i.e., by roughly 27%. This change was significant, as the Wald test for the constancy of
this parameter in the first row of Table 2.3 demonstrates. So we may conclude that by
significantly slowing down search intensity of the unskilled unemployed individuals the
entitlement extension reform has indeed contributed to the increase in their equilibrium
unemployment rate.
Moreover, the search intensity of the unskilled has fallen much more than search
intensity of the higher skill groups. For both skill group 2 (middle vocational train-
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ing) and group 3 (vocational training and college entrance exam or higher vocational
training) it has decreased by only about 12%. This finding goes in line with the ar-
gument that the benefit reform may potentially have an adverse negative effect on the
unemployment rates of the unskilled.
A remarkable result displayed in Table B.2 is that for workers with the highest skills
(group 4) λ0 has gone up from 0.0659 in 1986 to 0.0864 in 1995 which amounts to more
than 30%. Moreover, their reservation wage rose by about 1,200 D-Mark. In contrast,
for skill groups 1 and 3 it nearly did not change and for group 2 it rose by only about 200
D-Mark. A potential explanation for these results can be a skill-biased technological
change that raised the productivity and therefore the demand for qualified workers.
This hypothesis is supported by the fact that over the observation period, the wage
offer density for the high-skilled became less skewed and has considerably shifted to
the right (see Figure B.3). Such a change of curvature is a reflection of the relative
increase in firms’ productivity which is in line with the acceleration of technological
progress.
Consider now the separation rate δ. For the unskilled workers of group 1, it rose
from 0.0043 in 1986 to 0.0049 in 1995; i.e., by about 14%. Remarkable enough is that for
group 2 the upward shift of the separation rate was about the same, whereas for group 3
it became about 26% and for group 4 even 33%. So the unemployment rates of the least
qualified workers were actually subject to a weaker pressure of match break incidence.
Still, taking a look at the third row of Table 2.3 we see that the observed 14% increase
of the exit rate to unemployment among the least qualified workers is statistically
significant. This implies that the increase of δ has also significantly contributed to
the upward shift of the unemployment rate. However, as long as in the model δ is
exogenous to the worker and theoretically absorbs all other possible reasons for match
dissolution, it is an open question what share in the observed eventual 14% increase is
due to the entitlement extension.
Summarizing the findings above we conclude that the entitlement extension reforms
of the late 1980s have led to a significant slowdown in the search intensity among the
unemployed low-skilled workers. Moreover it is likely that they have also increased
shirking incentives among the employed low-skilled workers, which has lead to higher
separation rates. Taken together these two effects have led to the leap of unemployment
rates of least qualified workers. Furthermore, as it could be generally expected (see
for instance Nickell and Layard, 1999), this reform has brought about a significantly
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longer duration of unemployment for the unskilled.9
We also observe the similar influence for the second and third qualification groups.
However, the magnitude is much lower. For the highest skill group, skill biased tech-
nological change may have counteracted this effect over the period under review since
as a result no changes in unemployment rates were predicted.
Now let us proceed with the parameter estimates for λ1, the arrival rate of job
offers while employed. They are also displayed in Table B.2. From 1986 to 1995 for
skill groups 1, 2 and 4, the estimates reveal a decrease of this arrival rate of about
20%, 12% and 34%, respectively. For group 3 instead, it rose by roughly 20%. These
results are somewhat puzzling. With skill-biased technological change, one would have
expected, that the higher is the skill level, the bigger should be the percentage change
in the arrival rate of job offers. Instead, however, we observe that after having increased
for the third group the arrival rate of job offers has immensely decreased for group 4,
workers with the highest skills. As a possible explanation to this phenomenon one
may suggest that firms post too high wages for workers of the skill group 4 because
the highly skilled personnel becomes increasingly important. However, we regard this
interpretation as rather speculative.
Finally, considering the changes in λ1 for the first two qualification groups we may
think that the skill-biased technological progress obscures the promotion prospects of
the low-skilled. We observe that the less qualified the worker is, the fewer chances of
finding a better paid job he/she has.
Concluding the discussion of this subsection it would be natural to go over the policy
measures that our results imply. As we have discovered, the extension of entitlement
to UI has significantly affected the search intensity of unemployed low-skilled workers
and through this contributed to the increase of equilibrium unemployment rate in
this group. Moreover it has also raised the expected duration of being unemployed.
Therefore if one pursues the goal of reducing the unemployment rate and tries to
enhance incentives to return to work faster, changing the entitlement length could be
a valuable instrument.
9This conclusion follows automatically, since the expected unemployment duration within the the-
oretical model is just a reciprocal search intensity parameter of unemployed workers.
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2.6.4 Estimation Results by Age
Let us consider the results for different age groups (see Table B.3 of the Appendix).
Here we would expect that the reforms should induce a significant increase in the
unemployment rate of the eldest workers. Furthermore, the absolute value of this
increase is also expected to be the biggest among all the other groups. Our estimation
results indeed reflect such kind of dynamics. Table B.3 shows that from 1986 to 1995 the
expected unemployment rate of workers over 54 went up by 28% (from 11.4% to 14.6%).
However we significantly underpredict the magnitude of the actual change because the
sample fraction of unemployed individuals in this age group has risen from 9.3% to
16.3%, i.e. by more than 70% (see Table 2.2). Percentage changes of the predicted
unemployment rates for the other age groups 1 (16-27 years), 2 (28-40 years), and 3
(41-53 years) are about 15%, 44% and 22% respectively. But again, for the second age
group the percentage increase turns out to be higher than the corresponding increase
in the eldest group. And this is in odds with the entitlement extension scheme, since
for the workers younger than 42 years maximum duration of UI receipt has remained
intact. So, unlike in the case with skill groups, for the eldest workers the model fails
to provide a good fit to the data.
Let us analyze the results for λ0 and δ in more detail. From Table B.3 one can
see that for the oldest group search intensity in unemployment has reduced by roughly
10%. Ceteris paribus, this change would have lifted the equilibrium unemployment rate
of the elder workers up to 12.6%. Yet according to the Wald test in Table 3 for these
workers we cannot reject the hypothesis that the parameter λ0 is the same in 1986 and
1995. This means that our model does not support the argument that the entitlement
extension affects the unemployment rates of the elder workers through inhibiting their
search intensity.
As to the other age groups, we could have expected that the arrival rate of job offers
would have fallen more for the elder workers than for the younger ones. If compared
with the group of workers that are 16 to 27 years old, the results are indeed in line with
our expectation: the arrival rate of job offers of the youngest fell by only about 2%
(see Table B.3). Though in the other two groups the group-specific percentage change
is quite similar to that of the eldest workers.
Consider now the arrival rate of employer-employee match break. From 1986 to
1995 the incidence of job loss among the eldest individuals rose by about 18%, whereas
53
for the three younger groups, it rose by 14%, 30% and 13% respectively. So again we
cannot even state that the exit rate positively depends on age, which could have been
otherwise expected.
To see whether the observed 18% increase in δ has significantly contributed to the
increase of unemployment rates among the oldest workers we again test the hypothesis
of the constancy of δ over time. The results in Table 2.3 indicate rejection. This
establishes the fact that changes in unemployment profiles of elder workers are mainly
explained by the increased match break incidence. Partly this result is in line with our
expectations. Due to the Employment Promotion Act of 1986 unemployed people of at
least 58 years old were granted a possibility to be no longer available for mediation into
jobs, provided that they would retire early (at the age of 60). This could have made
a job loss for elder workers more acceptable and therefore could have increased their
incentives to shirk. Consequently the likelihood that firms terminate the employment
of elder workers would go up, since such termination could be done amicably given the
generous (essentially, infinite) benefit entitlements that the elder workers have become
able to get. As a result, match dissolution incidence should go up. And that is exactly
what we find.
Table B.3 also displays the predicted reservation wages of the four age groups for
the years 1986 and 1995. Reservation wages of those 54 to 64 years old have hardly
changed over this period indicating no impact of the UI reforms.
To summarize, we find that the chosen theoretical model is not rich enough to shed
light on the precise mechanisms that shifted up the unemployment rate of the oldest
workers. For this group the predicted change of the equilibrium unemployment rate is
considerably lower than the actual change in the sample. Hence we would also expect
that the changes in the parameter estimates are biased. This may be the reason why
our results for elder workers do not generally reflect our expectations about changes
of their search intensities, job loss rate and reservation wages. We discover that the
dynamics of unemployment rates of the eldest workers is mostly determined by the
changes in their group-specific separation rate. But still we see that the institutional
influence in this group is more complex, because now it consists of not only extended
entitlement to UI benefits but also of the possibility of earlier retirement. As long
as under the assumptions of the model the rate of job loss is exogenous we are not
able to say definitely which of the two stands behind it. Though in view of statistical
insignificance of the changes in search behavior of the oldest group, we would tend to
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think that the suggested early retirement argument may be an explanation.
2.7 Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter we ask whether the reforms that extended the entitlement length to UI
benefit payments in West Germany had a significant contribution to the increase in
unemployment rates among unskilled and elder workers. We try to answer this question
by estimating the parameters of the theoretical search equilibrium model of Burdett
and Mortensen (1998) with heterogenous employers. Our choice of the theoretical
framework is determined by the fact that through the individual search behavior the
model makes it possible to link the increased UI entitlement length with the subsequent
dynamics of unemployment rates.
To estimate the model we firstly use the structural nonparametric approach sug-
gested by Bontemps et al. (2000). However, we discover that this procedure cannot be
always applicable and find a data-driven condition, which demonstrates the limitations
of this estimation techniques. As long as the applicability condition which we refer to
as “constraint inconsistency” is not satisfied in our case, we proceed with the structural
estimation method suggested by Bowlus et al. (1995), (2001).
We find that for unskilled workers the extension of the entitlement period has
significantly influenced search behavior. Both arrival rates of job offers to unemployed
and employed workers went down. Moreover the arrival rate of employee-employer
match went up considerably. A slowdown in unemployment search intensity along
with increased incentives to shirk induced by the UI system after the reforms has led
to the increase of predicted unemployment rates in this group. The unemployment
rate for the unskilled predicted by the model shifts from 10.3% to 15.1% which almost
completely matches the 9.2% to 16.4% increase of the same rate observed in the data.
As to the elder workers, a pure search intensity adjustment argument turns out to
be insufficient to present a satisfactory explanation of unemployment rate dynamics.
However, the model mirrors the phenomenon of increased unemployment rates between
1986 and 1995 predicting a higher exit from jobs into unemployment. We know that
for this group of workers the entitlement to unemployment benefit payments became
particularly long in the second half of the 1980s. Additionally, whenever out of job,
under certain conditions elder workers were granted a possibility to retire earlier. Taken
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together this may have made a job loss more acceptable and gave employers an incentive
to dismiss old workers rather than the others. So it looks like the benefit and retirement
reforms have affected the exit rates into unemployment rather than search behavior of
the elder. Still our model is not rich enough to separate these two institutional effects.
In this context, it is interesting to note that recent labour market reforms instituted
in Germany are likely to reverse some of the phenomena discussed in this chapter. In
particular the duration of entitlement to UI has been shortened twice (in 1997 and
in 2003) and the levels of UA benefits are being adjusted downwards to the level of
social assistance (starting from 2005). Furthermore reforms in the job referral system
of employment agencies aimed at lowering the costs of job search were undertaken
in 2003. Given the analysis of this chapter, such reforms should eventually induce a
significant reduction in unemployment rates.
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Chapter 3
Extension to Non-Linear
Technology with Increasing Returns
3.1 Introduction
It is generally agreed that the shape of the wage earnings distribution is determined
by the skill distribution of the work force, the production technology employed by the
economy and the search and matching frictions that govern the allocation of workers to
jobs. The aim of this chapter is to provide a theoretical and still empirically tractable
model that takes all three factors and its interactions into account. For doing so we
extend the search equilibrium model of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and derive an
explicit functional form for the wage offer and earnings distributions. Our extension
explicitly introduces different skill groups that are linked via a production function,
which permits increasing returns to scale. Introduction of skill differences allows for
the analysis of firms’ wage posting behavior, where firms simultaneously compete for
heterogeneous workers. The theoretical model presented in this chapter is developed
by Christian Holzner and adopted from Holzner and Launov (2005).
Since the endogenous wage distribution generated by the original Burdett-Mortensen
model has an upward-sloping density, which is at odds with the empirical observation
of a flat right tail, there has been a lot of effort to extend the original model in order to
generate a more realistic shape of the wage distribution. Mortensen (1990) introduced
differences in firm productivity and Bowlus et al. (1995) showed that this greatly im-
proves the fit to the empirical wage distribution. Bontemps et al. (2000) and Burdett
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and Mortensen (1998) formulate a closed-form solution for a continuous productivity
distribution, which translates into a right-tailed wage earnings distribution, depending
on the assumed productivity dispersion. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) extend this
for both employer and worker heterogeneity.
In this chapter our extension demonstrates that with skill multiplicity and a produc-
tion function that permits increasing returns to scale we get a unimodal right-skewed
wage offer and earnings densities with a decreasing right tail. Even though we also
introduce productivity dispersion the result about the shape of offer and earnings den-
sities is true even with identical employers. While the structural estimates of models
with continuous productivity dispersion as suggested by Bontemps et al. (2000) and
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) improve the fit to the empirical wage earnings distribu-
tion and the estimates of the labor market transition rates, they tell us nothing about
the production parameters governing the productivity dispersion (see Manning, 2003,
p.106f). In this chapter different production technologies are explicitly introduced.
As a result this allows us estimating the parameters of the production functions even
without using firms’ data.
We use the estimated parameters of our model to analyze whether there is over- or
underinvestment in human capital from a social welfare point of view, i.e. whether the
increase in output coming from educating the marginal individual is larger than the
marginal private costs of the shift of the skill structure. Underinvestment in (undi-
rected) search or matching models are analyzed by Acemoglu (1996) and Masters
(1998). Following Grout (1984) they provide models where underinvestment results
from the fact that search or matching frictions make it impossible for workers to cap-
ture the whole return on their investment. The same mechanism is at work in the the-
oretical model of the present chapter (however, underinvestment cannot be attributed
to rent sharing exclusively). Furthermore, allowing for segmented labor markets, where
unskilled workers do not search for the same jobs as skilled workers do (and vise versa),
makes both over- or underinvestment into education possible. The simple idea is that a
lower unemployment rate among high skilled workers can increase the return to human
capital investment as shown by Saint-Paul (1996).1
The estimation methodology applied in this chapter is based on the one considered
in Bowlus et al. (1995), (2001). However, skill-multiplicity and Cobb-Douglas produc-
1Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) show that the hold-up problem can be overcome if workers are able
to direct their search to potentially different markets.
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tion function used in the econometric model impose additional restrictions that must be
taken into account when applying the original method. First, these are the restrictions
that allow representing the subset of production parameters as a function of search fric-
tions parameters and the homogeneity degree of the Cobb-Douglas technology. Second,
these are the identification restrictions that appear with an introduction of employer
heterogeneity. Our estimation problem can be also related to that of Bowlus and Eck-
stein (2002). Within the simple Burdett-Mortensen model Bowlus and Eckstein (2002)
analyze discrimination and skill differences by allowing for different productivity and
different transition parameters across races as well as incorporating discrimination of
employers. However, unlike in Bowlus and Eckstein (2002), we estimate the parameters
of interest by maximum likelihood.
Our empirical investigation tries to answer whether over- or underinvestment into
skills is present in the German economy. The main result of the empirical application
of the model is that there is a strong underinvestment into education at the low-to-
medium skill level.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The theory is summarized in Section 2. Here
we discuss the extension the original Burdett-Mortensen framework. The empirical
implementation of the model is treated in Section 3. We formulate the appropriate
likelihood function and discuss the relevant estimation method and identification issues.
Thereafter we provide a brief description of the data set and in detail discuss the results
of the structural estimation of the model. Section 4 concludes.
3.2 Theory
In this section we outline the extension of the original BM model by introducing differ-
ent skill groups and technologies that link the skill groups in the production process.
3.2.1 Framework
The model has an infinite horizon, is set in continuous time and concentrates on steady
states. Workers are assumed to be risk neutral and to discount at rate r. Each worker
belongs to a skill group i = 1, 2, ..., I whose measures are defined as qi, satisfying∑
qi = m. The measure ui of workers is unemployed and the measure qi−ui is employed.
Before choosing a skill-group workers incur a cost ci for skill-specific education. By
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assuming perfect capital market workers are able to borrow the cost of education. Once
incurred, the education cost is sunk.
Workers search for a job in the skill-segmented labor markets. With probability λi
unemployed workers of skill group i encounter a firm that makes them a wage offer
corresponding to their education, and with probability λe employed workers encounter
a firm (common for all skills). Then workers decide whether to accept or reject the job
offer. Job-worker match is destroyed at an exogenous rate δ > 0.
We assume that there exist J distinct production technologies Yj (l (w | R, F (w)))
indexed by j, where l (w | R, F (w)) is the vector of skill groups li (w | Ri, Fi (w))
employed by a firm with technology j. The size li (w | Ri, Fi (w)) of the skill group
depends on the firm’s wage offer wi, the workers’ reservation wage Ri and the skill
specific wage offer distribution Fi(w). We further assume that skill inputs in the
production function are complementary.
3.2.2 Workers’ Search Strategy
The optimal search strategy for a worker of occupation i is characterized by a reserva-
tion wage Ri, where an unemployed worker is indifferent between accepting or rejecting
a wage offer, i.e. Ui = Vi(Ri), where Ui is the value of being unemployed and Vi(Ri) the
value of being employed at the reservation wage Ri. Flow values of being unemployed
and employed
rUi = λi
∫ w̄i
Ri
(Vi(xi)− Ui) dFi(xi)− ci, (3.1a)
rVi(wi) = wi + λe
∫ w̄i
wi
(Vi(xi)− Vi(wi)) dFi(xi) + δ (Ui − Vi(wi))− ci (3.1b)
respectively, can be solved for a reservation wage2
Ri = (λi − λe)
w̄i∫
Ri
(
1− Fi(x)
r + δ + λe(1− Fi(x−))
)
dx. (3.2)
It can be readily seen that for the workers’ optimal behavior there is no conceptual
difference between single skill model and skill multiplicity. The only new feature here
2The solution completely carries over from Mortensen and Neumann (1988).
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is just skill-segmented wage offer. The wage offer distribution is given by Fi(w) =
Fi(w
−) + υi(w), where υi(w) is the mass of firms offering wage w to skill group i.
3.2.3 Employers’ Wage Posting
Equating the flows in and out of unemployment gives the steady state measure of
unemployed per skill group, i.e.
ui =
δ
δ + λi
qi. (3.3)
Given the assumptions of constant Poisson arrival rates λi, λe and the constant sepa-
ration rate δ Mortensen (1999) has shown that skill group size evolves according to a
special Markov-chain known as stochastic birth-death process. Expected value of the
skill-specific labor force size is given by
E [li (w | Ri, Fi (w))] = δλi (δ + λe) / (δ + λi)[
δ + λeF i(w)
] [
δ + λeF i(w−)
]qi, (3.4)
where it can be seen that the expected skill group size is an increasing function of the
offered wage w. Furthermore steady-state measure of employed workers earning a wage
less than w becomes
Gi(w
−)(qi − ui) = λiFi(w
−)ui
δ + λeF i(w−)
. (3.5)
which is analog of (1.3a) in Chapter 1.
Each firm posts a wage schedule w in order to maximize its profit, taking as given
the workers’ search strategy, i.e. the reservation wage vector R, and the other firms’
wage posting behavior, i.e. F (w). For tractability it is assumed that a firm can specify
its wage policy w only once (see Holzner and Launov, 2005, for discussion). Thus the
profit maximization problem of a type j firm as
πj = max
w
[
Yj (E [l (w)])−wT E [l (w)]
]
. (3.6)
Denote by Wj the set of wage offers that maximize equation (3.6), i.e. Wj =
arg max
w
πj, and the corresponding I-dimensional wage offer distribution for each firm
type j by Fj (w) = (F1j(w), F2j(w), ..., FIj(w)), where Fij(w) denotes the wage offer
distribution of type j firms for skill group i. Then the following definition of equilibrium
can be stated.
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Definition 3.1: A steady state wage posting equilibrium is a wage offer distribution
Fj (w) with w ∈ Wj for each firm type j ∈ J such that
πj = Yj (E [l (w)])−wT E [l (w)] for all w on the support of Fj (w) , (3.7)
πj ≥ Yj (E [l (w)])−wT E [l (w)] otherwise,
given the reservation wage Ri for each skill group i = 1, 2, ..., I and a corresponding
skill group wage offer distribution Fi (w) such that the reservation wage Ri satisfies
equation (3.2) given Fi (w).
Equilibrium concept in the extended model is the same as in the basic Burdett-
Mortensen model. Given the solution for the optimal workers’ behavior derivation of
the equilibrium wage offer distribution is performed in three steps. First, it is shown
that complementarity of skill inputs in the production technology implies positive wage
correlation within the firm. Whenever skill-specific offer distributions are continuous
positive wage correlation implies that for all w ∈ Wj
F kij (w) = F
k
lj (w) for all i, l = 1, 2, ..., I. (3.8)
Second, it is demonstrated that also in the multiple-skill framework more productive
employers offer higher wages, which leads to the fact that
Fi (wij) = γj (3.9)
Sufficient condition for continuity of Fij (w) is given by an inequality in which marginal
increase in the offered wage generates the increase in output that is strictly greater than
the corresponding marginal increase in labour costs.
Assuming that the sufficient condition for continuity holds let the j-th type technol-
ogy Yj (l (wj)) have a degree of homogeneity ξj and be twice differentiable with respect
to production factors, which leads to the Taylor Expansion
Yj (l (wj)) = Yj (rj) +
∑
i
Y ′j (rj) [rijhj (w)− rij] +
1
2
∑
i
σij [hj (w)− 1]2 ,
where
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hj (w) =
[
δ + λe
(
1− γj−1
)]2
[
δ + λeF j (w)
]2 , rij =
δ (δ + λe) λi/ (δ + λi)[
δ + λe
(
1− γj−1
)]2 qi,
Y ′j (rj) =
∂Yj (rj)
∂li
and σij =
∑
l
∂2Yj (rj)
∂li∂ll
rljrij =
(
ξj − 1
)
Y ′j (rj) rij.
Using the above listed results, invoking the equal profit condition πj = π
R
j and
applying the first order condition on (3.6) the following solution for Fi(w) as a function
of w obtains.
Proposition 3.1 Given that production functions Yj (E [l (w)]) ∀j = 1, 2, ..., J are
homogeneous of degree ξj ≥ 1, and if no mass point exists a unique equilibrium wage
offer distribution Fij(w) for each skill group i = 1, 2, ..., I exists that has the form
(i) for ξj = 1
Fij(w) =
δ + λe
λe
− δ + λe(1− γj−1)
λe
√
Y ′j (rj)− w
Y ′j (rj)− wij
, (3.10)
(ii) for ξj > 1
Fij(w) =
δ + λe
λe
− δ + λe
(
1− γj−1
)
λe
√
(Y ′j (rj)−wi)rij−σij−
q
((Y ′j (rj)−wi)rij−σij)
2
+4(σij−µij)((Y ′j (rj)−wij)rij−µij)
−2(σij−µij)
(3.11)
for any w ∈ [wij, wij], where
µij =
rij∑
i rij
1
2
∑
i
σij,
Proof. See Holzner and Launov (2005).
The aggregate wage offer distribution is given by
F (w) =
I∑
i=1
qi
m
Fi(w) =
I∑
i=1
qi
m
J∑
j=1
(
γj − γj−1
)
Fij(w).
63
There also exists special case for Fij(w) when
(
Y ′j (rj)− wij
)
rij = µij. This case, how-
ever, implies artificial restrictions on ξj considering this case here is neither interesting
nor useful.
3.2.4 Properties of the Equilibrium Offer and Earnings Dis-
tributions
For a production function with homogeneity of degree one the explicit wage offer dis-
tribution resembles the distribution derived in Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and has
its typical increasing density. However, the functional form of (3.11) also permits the
densities with falling tail. From proof of Proposition 3.1 (see Holzner and Launov,
2005) it immediately follows that the necessary condition for an upward sloping wage
offer density ∂Fi(w)/∂w is
(
2− ξj
) ∂Yj (rj)
∂rij
− w > 0. (3.12)
This result implies ξ∗j > 2 as a sufficient degree of homogeneity that guaranties a
density function with the decreasing tail. Furthermore from (3.12) follows that as the
wage w increases the inequality becomes more likely to be violated implying that the
wage offer density can have an upward sloping part for small wages and an downward
sloping part for large wages.
Consider now the equilibrium earnings distribution Gi(w). Decreasing tail of fij(w)
implies the same for the earnings density gij(w). It is well known that the actual
earnings data have a heavy right tail that decreases slower then that of the densities
from the exponential family (see, for instance, Singh and Maddala, 1976, or Reed,
2001). To see if the model with increasing returns can predict the appropriate densities
we seek for the limiting behaviour of the right tail of gij(w).
The tail of the density function defined on [wi1, wiJ ] converges at the highest possible
rate. However letting {wiJ , wiJ} go to infinity we get the following result.
Proposition 3.2 Let wiJ → ∞ and wiJ → ∞ . Under the sufficient condition
for a decreasing right tail of fiJ(wi) the right tail of the equilibrium earnings density
giJ(wi) converges at the rate faster then w
−2. Speed of convergence is a power law that
positively depends on the degree of homogeneity of the production function.
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Proof. Using (3.5) and (3.11) one obtains the closed form solution for the equilibrium
earnings density
giJ(wi) =
(δ+λe)riJ
2λe(δ+λe(1−γJ−1))
×
√
−(Y
′
J (rJ )−wi)riJ−σiJ
2(σiJ−µiJ ) +
q
((Y ′J (rJ )−wi)riJ−σiJ)
2
+4(σiJ−µiJ )((Y ′J (rJ )−wiJ)riJ−µiJ)
2(σiJ−µiJ )√
((Y ′J (rJ)− wi) riJ − σiJ)2 + 4 (σiJ − µiJ) ((Y ′J (rJ)− wiJ) riJ − µiJ)
.
Define
A(wi) ≡ (Y
′
J (rJ )−wi)riJ−σiJ−
q
((Y ′J (rJ )−wi)riJ−σiJ)
2
+4(σiJ−µiJ )((Y ′J (rJ )−wiJ)riJ−µiJ)
−2(σiJ−µiJ ) and
B(wi) ≡ ((Y ′J (rJ)− wi) riJ − σiJ)2 + 4 (σiJ − µiJ) ((Y ′J (rJ)− wiJ) riJ − µiJ) .
Then the first derivative of giJ(wi) can be written down as
g′iJ(wi) = − (δ+λe)r
2
iJ
2λe(δ+λe(1−γJ−1))
A
1
2 (wi)
[
A(wi)
B
3
2 (wi)
− 3
2
1
B(wi)
]
.
For wiJ →∞ and wiJ →∞ A(wi) = O(1) and B(wi) = O
(
w
2(ξJ−1)
i
)
, which leads to
g′iJ(wi) = O
(
w
−2(ξJ−1)
i
)
.
Finally, under the sufficient condition for the decreasing right tail of the fiJ(wi) we
get g′iJ(wi) = O
(
w−2−δi
)
, where δ > 0.
The result of Proposition 3.2 tells us that the equilibrium earnings density en-
compasses the family of Pareto and Singh-Maddala densities, right tail of which is
acknowledged to have the best fit to the observed high-earnings data (see Singh and
Maddala, 1976). Similarly to the equilibrium densities of Bontemps et al. (2000),
tail behaviour of giJ(wi) excludes the distributions with the exponential speed of con-
vergence (e.g. lognormal) form the set of possible functional form candidates for the
equilibrium earnings distribution. Furthermore, increasing returns of the production
function extend the result of Proposition 8 in Bontemps et al. (2000) allowing earnings
density to converge both slower and faster then w−3.
Finally, we have to note that the assumption of the continuity of Fij(w) made to
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facilitate the derivation of (3.11) must be respected when the model is implemented
empirically (this issue is discussed in detail in Section 3.3.4).
3.3 Econometric Model
Here we consider in detail the structural econometric model based on the theory pre-
sented above. We assume a Cobb-Douglas production technology which allows for
constant and increasing returns to scale, i.e.
Yj(l(wj)) = pj
I∏
i=1
li(wj)
αij (3.13)
with
∑
i αij = ξj ≥ 1, αij > 0.
In general, we build upon the model developed by Bowlus et al. (1995), (2001).
In the discussion to follow we put special emphasis on such new features as parameter
identification and related modification of the estimation procedure.
3.3.1 The Likelihood Function
Let us start from the formulation of the likelihood function. The formulation goes
along the lines plotted in Section 1.4.1, taking only an account of skill multiplicity.
For Poisson process with rate θ the joint distribution of the elapsed (te) and residual
(tr) duration of time spent by an individual in a certain state of the labour market is
f(te, tr) = θ
2e−θ(te+tr). For an individual that belongs to i-th skill group the appropriate
Poisson rates are λi if the person is unemployed and δ + λe [1− Fi(w)] if the person is
employed at wage w. Furthermore:
• For Unemployed: Equilibrium probability of sampling an unemployed agent who
belongs to i-th skill group is m−1qiδ/ (δ + λi). In case the subsequent job transi-
tion is observed we know the offered wage and can record the value of the wage
offer density fi(w).
• For Employed: Equilibrium probability of sampling an agent who belongs to i-th
skill group and earns wage w is m−1qigi(w)λi/ (δ + λi). In case the transition to
the next state is observed we record the destination state. The probabilities of
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exit to unemployment and to next job are ρj→u = δ/
(
δ + λeF i (w)
)
and ρj→j =
λeF i (w) /
(
δ + λeF i (w)
)
respectively.
For convenience of estimation, define κi = λi/δ , κe = λe/δ . Then the likelihood
contributions of unemployed (L(i) u) and employed (L(i) e) individuals affiliated with
i-th skill group is:
L(i) u = qi
m (1 + κi)
[δκi]
2−dr−dl e−δκi[te+tr] [fi(w)]
1−dr , (3.14)
L(i) e = gi(w) qi
m
κi
1 + κi
[
δ
(
1 + κeF i (w)
)]1−dl
e−δ(1+κeF i(w))[te+tr]
×
[[
δκeF i (w)
]dt
δ1−dt
]1−dr
. (3.15)
In (3.14) and (3.15) dl = 1, if a spell is left-censored, 0 otherwise; dr = 1, if a spell
is right-censored, 0 otherwise; dt = 1 if there is a job-to-job transition, 0 otherwise.
Substitution of the appropriate gi (w), fi(w) and Fi(w) into (3.14) and (3.15) completes
the formulation of the likelihood function (gi(w) is obtained from Fi(w) using (3.5)).
Notice that except of probability terms m−1qi/(1 + κi) and m−1qiκi/(1 + κi) (3.14)
and (3.15) are the same as in the previous two Chapters. The main differences are
rather driven by the functional forms of the offer and earnings distributions.
3.3.2 Homogeneous Firms
It is instructive to start with the model with no productivity dispersion, since the
theory allows obtaining an earnings density with a decreasing right tail even with
homogeneous employers. This density will have I − 1 jumps at infimum wages and
I − 1 spike at supremum wages of each skill group.
Under employer homogeneity the assumed production function modifies to Y (l(w)) =
p
∏I
l=1 ll(w)
αl . Functional form of the wage offer distribution with homogeneous em-
ployers is F (w) =
∑I
i=1
qi
m
Fi(w), where Fi(w) is given in Proposition 3.1 with J = 1.
Rewritten in terms of κi,e the skill-specific offer distribution becomes
Fi(wi) =
1 + κe
κe
− 1 + κe
κe
√
(Y ′i (r)−w)ri−σi−
q
((Y ′i (r)−w)ri−σi)
2
+4(σi−µi)((Y ′i (r)−wi)ri−µi)
−2(σi−µi)
, (3.16)
67
where
ri =
κi
(1 + κe) (1 + κi)
qi, Y
′
i (r) =
αi
ri
p
∏I
i=1
rαii ,
σi = αi (ξ − 1) Y (r) , and µi =
ri∑
i ri
1
2
∑
i
σi.
Recognizing that Fi(wi) = 1 we use Y (l(w)) to get the following solution for the
common productivity parameter
p =
ri∏I
i=1 r
αi
i
[
αi − ξ − 1
η
(
ξ (1 + η) ri
2
∑
i ri
− αi
)]−1 (
wi − ηwi
1− η
)
. (3.17)
where η = (1 + κe)
−2.
Consider the unknowns of the econometric model. The skill measures {qi}Ii=1 are
known from the data and they are nothing else but sample sizes of each skill group.
Furthermore, to avoid bounds of the likelihood function depending on the parameters,
Kiefer and Neumann (1993) suggest extreme order statistics {min(wi), max(wi)} as
the consistent estimates for wi and wi respectively. Finally, from the fact that (3.17)
holds for any i one can represent any αi as a function of ξ and the rest of structural
parameters. Namely (3.17) implies that for any i, l = 1, .., I there holds
αi
(wl − ηwl) rl
(wi − ηwi) ri
− αl = ξ (ξ − 1) (1 + η) rl
2 (ξ + η − 1) ∑Ik=1 rk
[
wl − ηwl
wi − ηwi
− 1
]
,
Without loss of generality setting i = 1, l = 2, ..., I and recognizing that α1 = ξ −∑I
k=2 αk, we get a system of I − 1 linear equations that is easily verified to provide
a unique solution for α in terms of
{
{κi}Ii=1 , κe, δ, ξ
}
. To see this it is sufficient
to rewrite the system in the matrix form. The matrix to be inverted will have a
particular structure that never allows one row to be a linear combination of the others
since
wl−ηwl
wi−ηwi > 0 ∀ i, l.
To demonstrate that the model with the parameter space that eventually reduces
to ξ and search frictions is identifiable it is enough to notice that frictions parameters{
{κi}Ii=1 , κe, δ
}
are uniquely identified from the duration data irrespective of the func-
tional form of the offer distribution (e.g. Koning et al., 1995). From this follows that
production size ξ is uniquely identified from the earnings data.
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3.3.3 Heterogeneous Firms
For heterogeneous employers the production functions are given in (3.13). The rele-
vant occupation-specific wage offer distribution Fi(w) is provided in Proposition 3.1.
Rewritten in κi,e terms it becomes
Fi(wi) =
1 + κe
κe
− 1 + κe
(
1− γj−1
)
κe
√
(Y ′j (rj)−wi)rij−σij−
q
((Y ′j (rj)−wi)rij−σij)
2
+4(σij−µij)((Y ′j (rj)−wij)rij−µij)
−2(σij−µij)
, (3.18)
where
rij =
κi/ (1 + κi) (1 + κe)[
1 + κe
(
1− γj−1
)]2 qi, Y ′j (rj) =
αij
rij
pj
∏I
i=1
r
αij
ij ,
σij = αij
(
ξj − 1
)
Yj (rj) , and µij =
rij∑
i rij
1
2
∑
i
σij
for all wi ∈ [wij, wij], i = 1, ..., I and j = 1, ..., J . Additionally we assume that for any
i and j none of αij is equal to each other.
Remembering that γj = Fi(wij) we use (3.13) and (3.18) to derive the productivity
level of the firm
pj =
rij∏I
i=1 r
αij
ij
[
αij −
ξj − 1
ηj
(
ξj
(
1 + ηj
)
rij
2
∑
i rij
− αij
)]−1 (
wij − ηjwij
1− ηj
)
, (3.19)
where ηj =
[(
1 + κe[1− γj]
)
/
(
1 + κe[1− γj−1]
)]2
.
Consider the unknowns of the econometric model with heterogeneous firms. As
before, skill group size and group-specific bounds for the offer distributions are available
from the data. At the same time there appears an additional set of unknown cutoff
wages {wij}I,J−1i,j=1 for the firm-specific wage offer. Unlike in the homogeneous model,
existence of the unknown cutoff wages does not allow using (3.19) to write down αij
as a function of exclusively ξj and frictional parameters. However, knowing that wij =
wij−1 provides us with additional cross-restrictions on pj−1 and pj. Using these cross-
restrictions together with the fact that (3.19) is the same for all i and noticing that
the parameter subsets {αij}I−1,Ji,j=1 and {wij}I,J−1i,j=1 are completely determined by (3.19)
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two representations of the model are possible:
1. cutoff wages {wij}I,J−1i,j=1 are expressed as a function of production parameters
{αij}I−1,Ji,j=1 , search frictions and ξ,
2. production parameters {αij}I−1,Ji,j=1 are expressed as a function of cutoff wages
{wij}I,J−1i,j=1 , search frictions and ξ.
First of all, irrespective of the choice of the parameter subset to be substituted
out, (3.19) implies that there exist J(I − 1) independent equations that completely
determine cutoff wages and production parameters.3 Moreover, for I skill groups there
exist (J − 1)I unknown production parameters and J(I − 1) unknown cutoff wages.
Since both above representations must be equivalent to each other we conclude that the
parameters cannot be identified whenever J(I − 1) 6= (J − 1)I. From this follows that
I = J symmetry is a necessary condition for identification of the model with employer
heterogeneity.
Next, we notice that despite both specifications are equally possible, expressing
cutoff wages as a function of the rest of the parameters, is the strictly dominated
one. The reason is that cutoff wages are the discontinuity points of the likelihood
function, so substituting them with known functions of the rest of the parameters
means that no gradient-based methods can be used when estimating the model. Even
though derivative-free methods are available a serious problem may appear when the
assumption of no mass points in the offer distribution becomes violated at the solution.
This case will imply constrained derivative-free optimization subject to the no mass
point condition (for detailed discussion see p.72 later on), which is already a very
difficult task.
Choosing the second way to represent the model one can show that (3.19) implies
that for any i, l = 1, .., I there holds an identity
αij
(
wlj − ηjwlj
)
rlj(
wij − ηjwij
)
rij
− αlj =
ξj
(
ξj − 1
) (
1 + ηj
)
rlj
2
(
ξj + ηj − 1
) ∑I
k=1 rkj
[
wlj − ηjwlj
wij − ηjwij
− 1
]
,
which gives rise to a system of J(I − 1) linear equations with J(I − 1) unknown cutoff
wages. It is also easy to see that for J = 1 the above identity reduces to the one
3i.e. neither {wij}I,J−1i,j=1 nor {αij}I−1,Ji,j=1 appear outside the system of these equations.
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described in the previous subsection. Rewriting the implied system in a matrix form
one can find that the matrix to be inverted is block-diagonal. Each and every block in
it has the same structure as the matrix of a corresponding problem in Section 3.3.2,
out of which invertability follows.
Unique solution for {αij}I−1,Ji,j=1 reduces the parameter space to the subset of the
location parameters of the discontinuity points of the likelihood function {wij}I,J−1i,j=1
and the subset of shape parameters θ ≡
{
{κi}Ii=1 , δ, κe,
{
ξj
}J
j=1
}
. Chernozhukov and
Hong (2004) demonstrate that in the considered class of models shape and location
parameters are independent of each other. Thus conditional identifiability will imply
joint identifiability of the both. Within the subset of shape parameters search frictions
are uniquely identified using the duration data. From this follows that production sizes
are uniquely identified from the earnings data.
The above representation of the model fits into a convenient stepwise estimation
strategy developed by Bowlus et al. (1995). At the first step, given the starting values
for the structural parameters, cutoff wages are estimated by simulated annealing. At
the second step, given the estimates of the cutoff wages, the likelihood function is
maximized with respect to θ. The second step is a “smooth” optimization and can be
efficiently executed using the gradient-based methods. Given the estimates from both
steps into (3.5) and (3.9) we calculate the new point mass values γj
γj = 1−
I∑
i=1
qi
m
1− Ĝi(wij)
1 + κeĜi(wij)
, (3.20)
where Ĝi is a nonparametric estimate of the skill-specific earnings distribution, and
the cycle repeats.
Provided that the maximum likelihood estimates are consistent with the assump-
tion of the continuity of Fij(w) we can apply the result of Chernozhukov and Hong
(2004) who show that the asymptotic distribution of the subset of shape parameters is
N(0, I−1), where
I =n−1
n∑
l=1
∂
∂θ
Ll (θ) ∂
∂θ
Ll (θ′) . (3.21)
Furthermore Chernozhukov and Hong (2004) validate bootstrap methods for the esti-
mation of the asymptotic covariance matrix above.
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3.3.4 Specification Check
We have derived the wage offer distribution (3.11) under the assumption that all skill
specific wage offer distributions Fi (w) are continuous. As argued in Section 3.2.3 a mass
point can only exist, if increasing the wage further would imply that the additional
wage cost outweighs the additional output produced with the additionally recruited
workers. Consider an arbitrary skill group h. Then the distribution function Fh (w) is
continuous, if for a type j firm limε→0 πj (wh + ε,w−h) > πj (w), i.e.
pj
(
κh(1+κe)/(1+κh)
[1+κeF h(w)]
2 qh
)αhj I∏
i=1
i 6=h
li(w)
αij − κh(1+κe)/(1+κh)
[1+κeF 1(w)]
2 whqh >
>
(
κh(1+κe)/(1+κh)
[1+κeF h(w)][1+κeF h(w−)]
qh
)αhj
pj
I∏
i=1
i6=h
li(w)
αij − κh(1+κe)/(1+κh)
[1+κeF h(w)][1+κeF h(w−)]
whqh.
First, note that this condition is satisfied for αhj ≥ 1. For αhj < 1 the concavity
of the production function implies that if a mass point exists at wh ∈ [whj, whj], then
increasing the wage by ε still implies that the additional wage cost outweighs the
additional output produced. Thus, if a mass point exists, then it exists at the upper
bound of the support of Fhj : supp(Fhj) = [whj, whj]. Together with the fact that
Fh (whj) = γj this implies that Fh(w
−
hj) = γj − υh(whj). Substituting whj for wh in the
equation above and rearranging gives the following inequality:
1−
(
1+κe(1−γj)
1+κe(1−γj+υ1(whj))
)αhj
1− 1+κe(1−γj)
1+κe(1−γj+υ1(whj))
>
whjlh(whj)
1−αhj
pj
∏I
i=1
i6=h
li(w)αij
. (3.22)
From (3.22) a necessary condition for continuity follows whenever limυh(whj)→0 (lhs) >
(rhs). Taking limit of the lhs and applying (3.8) to the rhs we get
ahj >
whjlh(whj)
pj
∏I
i=1 li(wij)
αij
(3.23)
The estimated parameters are consistent only when the model is properly specified, i.e.
when (3.23) holds.
It is also easy to see that in a special case with no skill differentiation, constant
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returns and unique productivity type firms, which is the original Burdett-Mortensen
model, (3.23) gives us 1 > w/p, which is always true, implying continuous offer distri-
bution in the basic BM model.
Furthermore the estimated parameters must be consistent with the assumption that
profits of the firms with different technologies are ranked, i.e.
0 ≤ πj−1 < πj. (3.24)
In terms of the Burdett-Mortensen model with discrete employer heterogeneity the
above condition will imply the ranking of productivity levels. Possibility of violation
of productivity ranking in applied work is discussed by Bowlus et al. (1995), p.S127.
One should also keep in mind that whenever any of the above restrictions is binding
at the maximum the asymptotic covariance matrix of the ML estimator is no longer
given by (3.21) and the exact form of it is unknown. Moreover even in the simpler mod-
els with inequality constraints it is shown that bootstrap fails to consistently estimate
the covariance matrix when the true parameter is on the boundary of the parameter
space (see Andrews, 2000, for discussion).
Finally we notice that in the extended model with distinct productivity types an-
other (weaker) way to see whether (3.8) holds is to consider Ĝi
(
wij|arg max
{θ,γj}
(L)
)
.
Both (3.8) and (3.5) imply that Ĝi = Ĝl ∀i, l ∈ [2, I]. At the same time (3.20) does
not restrict Ĝi to be equal to each other. Thus, if {θ,γj} ∀j ∈ [2, J − 1] is a consistent
estimate of the true parameters the values of the empirical earnings distribution at the
skill-specific cutoff wages must not be significantly different from each other.
3.4 Empirical Application
3.4.1 The Data
To estimate the model we use the data from the German Socio-Economic Panel. The
theoretical formulation of the model provides enough restrictions to estimate the pa-
rameters of the production function even without firm data. Thus, as before, we apply
duration and wage information only. In the present chapter we use the sample of 1995.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of Event History Data
Skills
Full
Low Medium High Sample
Number of individuals: 898 1931 1062 3891
Employed: 746 1786 1025 3557
Unemployed: 152 145 37 334
Employed Agents:
Uncensored observations with:
job → job transition: 49 187 178 414
job → unemployment transition: 98 126 41 256
mean time spell between two states [job duration]: 129.639 109.815 89.566 107.576
(std. deviation): (114.92) (102.14) (85.42) (101.01)
Censored observations
a) left-censored durations only
with job → job transition: 3 12 6 21
with job → unemployment transition: 1 13 1 15
b) right-censored durations only: 575 1407 781 2763
c) both left- and right-censored durations: 20 41 18 79
Mean time spell [both uncensored and censored]: 163.637 153.259 154.096 155.677
(std. deviation): (116.23) (118.84) (120.30) (118.76)
Unemployed Agents:
Uncensored observations (u → j transition): 37 49 13 99
mean time spell between two states [job duration]: 19.595 22.429 10.538 19.808
(std. deviation): (14.35) (26.72) (12.22) (21.41)
Censored observations
a) left-censored durations (u → j transition) only: 1 2 - 3
b) right-censored durations only: 106 89 24 219
c) both left- and right-censored durations: 8 5 - 13
Mean time spell [both uncensored and censored]: 40.974 32.310 24.270 35.362
(std. deviation): (36.37) (31.90) (23.07) (33.61)
Duration data in Months
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Target groups, sampling scheme and retrieving duration data is in detail described
in Section 2.4 so we do not repeat it here once again. Collecting earnings information
relevant for the estimation of the extended Burdett-Mortensen model needs, however,
some further explanations. In this chapter we differentiate between net wage received
by the worker and labour costs to the firm. In the theoretical model we have two sets
of parameters, namely workers’ search intensities and production parameters. Since
the theory states that reservation wage and labour size depend on just the position of
the firm in the wage offer distribution, frictional parameters can be estimated using
any of the two types of earnings data, provided that the ordering of the firms does
not change when we pass from net wages to labour costs. For identification of the
production parameters, to the contrary, labour costs are crucial because they enter the
employers’ profit maximization problem explicitly.
GSOEP provides the data on both net and gross wages. Individuals who are em-
ployed at their interview provide the earnings information of one month prior to the
interview. For the sample of job spells we use wage information provided by respon-
dents at the year for which the sample is drawn. For the sample of unemployment
spells we use the first reported wage after the end of unemployment, given that the
transition to the job is observed. All wages are deflated by the West German consumer
price index at prices of 1998. Labour costs are defined as a sum of gross wage and
firms’ contributions to the employees’ social security payments. Information on the
latter is available form the Social Security Office.
In our application we estimate the model with three different productivity levels
and three different skill groups. Skill stratification of the sample is performed on the
basis of the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). We identify
as “low- skilled” all individuals who have inadequate or general elementary training.
To “medium-skilled” group belong those who have got middle vocational training.
Finally, as “high-skilled” we qualify all the rest, i.e. those with higher vocational
training, university education etc.
Summary of duration and wage data is presented in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 respec-
tively. Along with the information about the full sample we present summary statistics
for the three skill groups. The data on skills reflect such basic facts about less skilled
in comparison to higher skilled as higher level of unemployment, higher rate of job
loss and longer unemployment duration. Additionally net wages and labour costs are
summarized by kernel density plots (see Figures C.1-2 in the Appendix). As expected,
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics of Earnings Data
Skills
Full
Low Medium High Sample
Labour Costs:
Sample Minimum: 734. 1038. 1646. 734.
Mean Cost: 4431 (1417) 5245 (1903) 6950 (2642) 5554 (2258)
Sample Maximum: 12057. 17348. 20523. 20523.
Net Wages:
Sample Minimum: 604. 635. 952. 604.
Mean Wage: 2472 (809) 2880 (1083) 3967 (1667) 3101 (1356)
Sample Maximum: 6878. 9524. 11534. 11534.
density of both net earnings and labour costs of the low-skilled are more peaked at
its’ leftmost part of the support than those of the higher skills. Also mean net wage
of high-skilled workers amounts to DM 3967 which exceeds that of medium-skilled by
27% and of low-skilled by more then 37%. Labour costs are roughly the same across
the skills and almost double the net wage.4
3.4.2 Estimation Results: Fit of the Model
First we estimate the model with identical employers setting off with the constant
returns assumption (see Table C.1 in the Appendix). When doing so we also fit the
original Burdett-Mortensen model with no productivity dispersion to compare it with
the results provided by our extension.5 It turns out that the structural parameters
estimated with both original and extended constant-returns specifications do not sig-
nificantly differ from each other, which implies that from the empirical perspective sole
4Note the difference between the skill group definitions in this Chapter and Chapter 2. Here
we use higher level of aggregation uniting groups 3 and 4 into “high” category. Also because for
certain individuals gross wages were unavailable the sample used in this Chapter has about 4% fewer
observations than the one of Chapter 2.
5We do not report the estimates from the original model here.
76
introduction of skill differences does not improve the estimates of search frictions. Pre-
dicted theoretical offer and labour costs densities (Figures C.3-4 respectively) for the
extended theoretical model with constant returns have two jumps at the reservation
wages of the medium- and high-skilled workers and two spikes at the maximum wages
of the low- and medium-skilled workers. This generates a quasi-“falling” right tail of
the aggregate density despite that skill-specific ones are strictly increasing. However,
even with large I the model with constant returns has limited potential of fitting the
data.
The results change when we switch to the increasing returns technology specification
(the second column in Table C.1). First, when inserted into (3.3), the estimates of κi
fit the observed skill-specific unemployment rates closer. Second, and more important,
the model with increasing returns provides much more realistic estimates for κe and
δ. Though the most interesting result is displayed in Figures C.3-4 where we see that
increasing returns imply offer and labour costs densities with strictly decreasing right
tail even in absence of productivity dispersion. Even though the predicted labour
costs density is still too flat pointing towards existence of heterogeneous production
technologies in the data, this result alone is already remarkable.
The initial unrestricted estimates of the model with increasing returns to scale do
not meet the “no mass point condition” of Section 3.3.4. Therefore in Table C.1 we
report the estimates which are obtained by maximizing the likelihood function subject
to (3.23). Furthermore we restrict profits to be non-negative. It turns out that at the
constrained maximum the condition in (3.23) becomes inactive. However, the non-
negativity of profits is violated on the upper end of the offer distribution and the non-
negativity constraint on profits remains binding at the maximum. As a consequence
the asymptotic covariance matrix of the estimated parameters becomes unknown.6
Next we estimate the model with employer heterogeneity. As before, we also fit
the original Burdett-Mortensen model with J = 3.7 Again, the results of the origi-
nal Burdett-Mortensen model and our extension with constant returns almost do not
differ from each other. Even though two jumps at the left tail and two spikes at the
right one improve the fit of the aggregate labour costs density (see Figures C.5-6),
6We report confidence intervals based on (3.21). However, since the true parameters lie on the
boundary of the parameter space, (3.21) underestimates the true covariance matrix (see also Section
3.3.4).
7Again we do not report the estimates from the basic model.
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locally increasing right tail of individual-specific densities still keeps the fit from being
satisfactory.
Relaxing the assumption of constant returns again changes the picture. Though,
similarly to the case with identical firms, the unrestricted MLEs still violate profit
ranking requirement. Therefore we perform the estimation of the model given (3.23)
and (3.24). Remarkable enough, in the restricted maximum the “no mass point con-
dition” of Section 3.3.4 is again inactive which empirically supports the k-percent rule
(3.8). However π(wij−1) < π(wij) turn out to be binding. On one hand this may be
simply a consequence of the insufficient heterogeneity of the production side. On the
other, this can also be interpreted as an empirical indication of the restrictiveness of
the equal-profit condition among the firms with the same technology. While the first
interpretation opens a purely empirical issue that can be amended by just increasing
the number of distinct skill levels, resolution of the alternative case would require a
more refined theoretical model.
The estimates of the model with increasing returns and three-point productivity
dispersion are presented in the second column of Table C.2. Comparing them with
the estimates from the specification with identical firms and increasing returns tech-
nology two further improvements can be noticed. First, we manage to obtain a better
fit for the degree of returns to scale in the whole economy. According to our esti-
mates the homogeneity degrees are 1.04 for the “low-productive” technology, 1.40 for
the “medium-productive” technology and 4.92 for the “high-productive” one. Given
the estimated fraction of each technology
[
γj − γj−1
]
in the economy these estimates
imply the economy-wide returns to scale at the level of 1.20. This goes in line with
numerous evidences from the literature on the estimation of the returns to scale using
different types of production functions. Typical estimates in this literature support
the increasing returns hypothesis and range from about 1.1 to about 1.35 (see Färe at
al., 1985, Kim, 1992, and Zellner and Ryu, 1998, and references therein). Second, and
even more important, productivity dispersion along with increasing returns technolo-
gies also leads to a better fitting offer and labour costs densities. In Figures C.5-6 one
can easily see the dominance of increasing over constant returns specification in terms
of both shape of the right tail and smoothed out spikes around the mean.
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3.4.3 Estimation Results: Social Returns to Education
We use our estimation results to investigate whether the education level in the economy
is efficient, i.e. whether the increase in output coming from educating the marginal
individual equals the individual’s and the government’s investment costs.
In our model the increase in education is reflected by the marginal shift of the skill
structure towards the higher fraction of more skilled workers. From the point of view of
the social welfare planner positive externality will exist if the expected output increase
induced by this marginal shift of the skill structure will be big enough to cover private
costs of educating a marginal worker to the next level and will generate a positive
excess value.8
Denote the measure of any adjacent skill groups by n so that n = qi + qi+1. It is
easy to show that for a j-type firm the marginal change in output due to educating a
marginal i-skilled worker one level up (i.e. due to the marginal increase of the measure
of i + 1-skilled workers) is
∂Yj(l(w))
∂qi+1
= Yj(l(w))
[
I∑
k=1
αkj
lk(w)
∂lk(w)
∂qk
]
= Yj(l(w))
[
αi+1j
qi+1
− αij
n− qi+1 +
2κe (αij + αi+1j)
1 + κe [1− F ]
(
∂F
∂qi
)]
which implies an expected change in the total output
E(∆Y ) =
∫ 1
0
∂Yj(l(w))
∂qi+1
dF =
J∑
j=1
∫ γj
γj−1
∂Yj(l(w))
∂qi+1
dF . (3.25)
In order to learn whether the social returns from educating an agent to a higher
skill level exceed the private returns of doing so, we proceed in comparing the marginal
increase in output caused by a change in the skill structure with the cost the marginal
individual incurs to acquire this skill level. It has to be true that in equilibrium the
marginal worker is exactly indifferent between the two skill groups, i.e. Ui = Ui−1.
Thus, using (3.1a), the private cost of educating oneself one level up can be written as
8For more rigorous theoretical treatment of the social welfare planner’s problem see Holzner and
Launov, 2005, Section 4.3
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(ci − ci−1) aIi = rUi − rUi−1
=κi
∫ w̄i
wri
F̄i(w)
1 + r/δ + κeF̄i(w)
dw − κi−1
∫ w̄i−1
wri−1
F̄i−1(w)
1 + r/δ + κeF̄i−1(w)
dw.
(3.26)
Note, that (3.26) refers to the optimal decision of the searching individual, which implies
that the net wages wri and wi – not the wage costs – are the bounds of the distribution
of the net offer. Therefore in order to compute the correct difference in private costs
we have to translate the estimated cutoff wages expressed in terms of labour costs into
the cutoff wages expressed in terms of net earnings (which is possible since we know
nonparametric estimates of both labour costs and net earnings cdfs). Finally, drawing
on the OECD statistics, the average real interest rate over the considered period of
1984-2001 is equal to 3.6%.9
We use the estimates of the structural parameters to evaluate (3.25)-(3.26) and see
whether present skill structure is efficient. In doing so we consider two cases, namely:
1. Marginal shift from Medium to High skills (the fraction of low-skilled is constant),
2. Marginal shift from Low to Medium skills (the fraction of high-skilled is constant).
Our key finding is that indeed a marginal change of the skill structure towards a
larger share of skilled workers uniformly generates an increase in output.
Taking the first case, the marginal increase of the fraction of high-skilled workers
by educating the medium-skilled ones induces the expected output increase of DM
2269.88. At the same time the period private cost of this increase amount to DM
2277.60, from which follows that the fraction of high-skilled workers almost precisely
matches its’ socially optimal level.
For the next case, however, the situation is different. The output effect of the
marginal change of the skill structure towards increasing the share of medium-skilled
workers in the economy is again positive and, although somewhat smaller in absolute
value, amounts to DM 2057.27. But the individual costs that trigger this effect lie at
the level of DM 821.67, which is more than twice as low. Thus we obtain a strong
9Source: OECD Economic Outlook, No.77. Price base for the calculation is set to 1998, as that of
the earnings data.
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evidence of underinvestment into skills at the low-to-medium level and conclude that
subsidizing the education of the low-skilled must be welfare improving from the social
prospective. Going back to the definition of skills this means that it would be socially
optimal to reduce the fraction of workers with inadequate or general elementary training
and increase the fraction of those with middle-vocational training.
To conclude, the present paper offers a new approach to measuring social returns to
education within an equilibrium framework which takes the skill specific unemployment
risk explicitly into account. As a result we are able to provide insights of whether there
is over- or underinvestment in an economy. At the same time our framework does
not allow determining the source of the inefficiency. The detected underinvestment
could either be caused by the hold-up problem that workers face when making their
investment decision or by a positive human capital externality due to an education
spillover.
Abstracting from the application to social returns, our results also appear to be
in line with those of Falk and Koebel (1999) who show that output is a positive and
increasing function of skills and that output effect dominates in explaining the shift
away from unskilled labour in Germany.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we consider the extension of the search equilibrium model of Burdett and
Mortensen (1998). The extension of the original model introduces different skill groups
and links them via a production function that permits both constant and increasing
returns to scale. The main theoretical contribution of the extension is that whenever
the production function exhibits increasing returns to scale a decreasing wage offer
density obtains. Subsequent introduction of employer heterogeneity leads to a further
improvement of the shape of wage offer and earnings distributions predicted by the
model.
The theoretical solution of our extension suggests a structural econometric model
that allows estimating not only search frictions inherent to the labour market but
also the parameters of the production function. The richness of the theoretical model
enables us to estimate all parameters of interest using wage and duration data only,
which requires no additional information on output.
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We apply our model to learn whether there is over- or underinvestment into human
capital in Germany. Our results suggest that the cost of a marginal shift of the skill
composition of the workforce away from the low-skilled and towards a larger share of
medium-skilled workers is expected to be lower than the expected increase in output,
induced by this shift. This suggests that social returns to education exceed private
returns and that a policy designed to promote education at lower levels would be
welfare improving.
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Figure A.1: Wage Offer and Earnings Densities for the Two Samples
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Figure A.2: Wage Offer and Earnings Distributions for the Two Samples
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Figure A.3: Expected Job Duration (years)
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Figure A.4: Index of Monopsony Power
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Figure A.5: Profit Ratio Plot
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Table B.1: Estimated Model for the Whole Economy
Sample: 1986 Sample: 1995
Coefficients (Std.Errors) Coefficients (Std.Errors)
κ0 12.7914 (0.4767) κ0 9.3459 (0.3428)
κ1 4.8014 (0.1157) κ1 4.0133 (0.1126)
δ 0.0036 (6.3·10-5) δ 0.0041 (8.0·10-5)
Estimated Productivity Distribution: Estimated Productivity Distribution:
i : Pi γi i : Pi γi
1 2304.6 0.65561 1 2758.0 0.62421
2 2726.6 0.81784 2 3120.4 0.79455
3 3289.8 0.90804 3 3845.8 0.88384
4 4601.5 0.95306 4 4738.5 0.92208
5 7997.2 0.98269 5 6147.2 0.94792
6 18630.5 0.99529 6 8673.3 0.97320
7 62728.1 0.99897 7 13906.5 0.98731
8 437143.1 1 8 24442.1 0.99331
9 53593.8 0.99769
10 232585.7 1
Log(Likelihood): -74245.072 Log(Likelihood): -61075.378
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Table B.2: Estimated Model for Different Qualification Groups
1986 1995
Qualification Groups Coefficients (Std.Errors) u R Coefficients (Std.Errors) u R
Group I: λ0 0.0373 (0.0023) λ0 0.0273 (0.0017)
(inadequately or general λ1 0.0110 (0.0006) 0.103 1768.9 λ1 0.0088 (0.0006) 0.151 1800.4
elementary) δ 0.0043 (1.4× 10−4) δ 0.0049 (1.9× 10−4)
Number of mass points in γ(p): 7 Number of mass points in γ(p): 7
Number of observations: 1401 Number of observations: 933
Log(Likelihood): −20331.83 Log(Likelihood): −13319.29
Group II: λ0 0.0513 (0.0028) λ0 0.0449 (0.0024)
(middle vocational) λ1 0.0179 (0.0006) 0.067 2036.0 λ1 0.0157 (0.0006) 0.087 2238.6
δ 0.0037 (9.1× 10−5) δ 0.0043 (1.2× 10−4)
Number of mass points in γ(p): 8 Number of mass points in γ(p): 7
Number of observations: 2381 Number of observations: 1973
Log(Likelihood): −35969.58 Log(Likelihood): −29618.12
Group III: λ0 0.0746 (0.0104) λ0 0.0659 (0.0080)
(vocational + ”Abitur” λ1 0.0184 (0.0012) 0.040 2852.1 λ1 0.0221 (0.0015) 0.055 2858.3
or higher vocational) δ 0.0031 (1.5× 10−4) δ 0.0039 (1.9× 10−4)
Number of mass points in γ(p): 8 Number of mass points in γ(p): 7
Number of observations: 616 Number of observations: 587
Log(Likelihood): −9643.23 Log(Likelihood): −9078.60
Group IV: λ0 0.0659 (0.0103) λ0 0.0864 (0.0131)
(higher education) λ1 0.0434 (0.0031) 0.043 2488.2 λ1 0.0285 (0.0021) 0.044 3687.5
δ 0.0030 (1.8× 10−4) δ 0.0040 (2.2× 10−4)
Number of mass points in γ(p): 9 Number of mass points in γ(p): 7
Number of observations: 450 Number of observations: 488
Log(Likelihood): −7146.4097 Log(Likelihood): −7828.00
Table B.3: Estimated Model for Different Age Groups
1986 1995
Qualification Groups Coefficients (Std.Errors) u R Coefficients (Std.Errors) u R
Group I: λ0 0.0781 (0.0053) λ0 0.0766 (0.0060)
(16-27 years old) λ1 0.0533 (0.0026) 0.096 1016.1 λ1 0.0357 (0.0022) 0.111 1479.2
δ 0.0083 (3.1× 10−4) δ 0.0095 (4.2× 10−4)
Number of mass points in γ(p): 7 Number of mass points in γ(p): 6
Number of observations: 1110 Number of observations: 745
Log(Likelihood): −15799.39 Log(Likelihood): −10334.69
Group II: λ0 0.0664 (0.0047) λ0 0.0584 (0.0037)
(28-40 years old) λ1 0.0164 (0.0007) 0.057 2437.3 λ1 0.0238 (0.0010) 0.081 2244.5
δ 0.0040 (1.2× 10−4) δ 0.0052 (1.6× 10−4)
Number of mass points in γ(p): 7 Number of mass points in γ(p): 8
Number of observations: 1609 Number of observations: 1527
Log(Likelihood): −25096.58 Log(Likelihood): −23409.19
Group III: λ0 0.0408 (0.0028) λ0 0.0372 (0.0027)
(41-53 years old) λ1 0.0068 (0.0003) 0.070 2983.0 λ1 0.0056 (0.0004) 0.087 3328.2
δ 0.0031 (9.1× 10−5) δ 0.0035 (1.3× 10−4)
Number of mass points in γ(p): 7 Number of mass points in γ(p): 4
Number of observations: 1583 Number of observations: 1121
Log(Likelihood): −24712.09 Log(Likelihood): −17411.64
Group IV: λ0 0.0215 (0.0021) λ0 0.0194 (0.0015)
(54-64 years old) λ1 0.0032 (0.0003) 0.114 3165.2 λ1 0.0030 (0.0003) 0.146 3114.4
δ 0.0028 (1.5× 10−4) δ 0.0033 (1.5× 10−4)
Number of mass points in γ(p): 5 Number of mass points in γ(p): 7
Number of observations: 575 Number of observations: 637
Log(Likelihood): −8021.41 Log(Likelihood): −9344.46
Figure B.1: Estimated Theoretical Offer and Earnings Distributions for the whole
Economy: Sample 1986
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Figure B.2: Estimated Theoretical Offer and Earnings Distributions for the whole
Economy: Sample 1995
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Figure B.3: Estimated Theoretical Wage Offer Densities for the High Skilled Group
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Figure C.1: Kernel Estimates of Earnings Densities
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Figure C.2: Kernel Estimates of Labour Cost Densities
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Table C.1: Estimation Results: Homogeneous Firms
Specification
Constant Returns ∗ Increasing Returns
κu1 4.6182 [4.1640, 5.0725] 5.9115 [5.2372, 6.5858]
κu2 8.2312 [7.6093, 8.8531] 10.4875 [9.5566, 11.4183]
κu3 14.1192 [12.5421, 15.6963] 17.8712 [15.4814, 20.2611]
κe 0.1605 [0.1421, 0.1789] 2.0963 [1.7342, 2.4585]
δ 0.0066 [0.063, 0.0068] 0.0043 [0.0041, 0.0045]
ξ 2.0000 [1.7945, 2.2053]
α1 0.1513 0.3704
α2 0.5080 1.0044
ln(L) −68248.06 −66758.10
∗Here and henceforward 95% confidence intervals in square brackets
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Figure C.3: Aggregate Wage Offer Densities: Homogeneous Firms
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Figure C.4: Theoretical Earnings Densities: Homogeneous Firms
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Table C.2: Estimation Results: 3-Point Employer Heterogeneity
Specification
Constant Returns Increasing Returns
κu1 5.6156 [4.9973, 6.2339] κu1 5.9612 [5.2742, 6.6481]
κu2 9.9702 [9.1169, 10.8234] κu2 10.6176 [9.6662, 11.5691]
κu3 17.0121 [14.8258, 19.1985] κu3 18.0656 [15.6320, 20.4991]
κe 2.1277 [1.9869, 2.2684] κe 3.6432 [3.3926, 3.8939]
δ 0.0047 [0.0045, 0.0049] δ 0.0042 [0.0040, 0.0044]
ξ1 1.0381 [1.0324, 1.0437]
ξ2 1.3961 [1.2977, 1.4945]
ξ3 4.9201 [3.1342, 6.7060]
{αij} j = 1 j = 2 j = 3 {αij} j = 1 j = 2 j = 3
i = 1 0.1772 0.1449 0.1499 i = 1 0.1896 0.2466 0.9822
i = 2 0.4622 0.4939 0.5212 i = 2 0.4850 0.6586 2.4929
{wij} j = 1 j = 2 {wij} j = 1 j = 2
i = 1 4431 5698 i = 1 4431 5698
i = 2 5065 7597 i = 2 5065 6964
i = 3 6964 9992 i = 3 6964 9992
j = 1 j = 2 j = 1 j = 2
γj 0.7905 0.9610 γj 0.8485 0.9685
ln(L) −65059.96 ln(L) −64843.50
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Figure C.5: Aggregate Wage Offer Densities: 3-Point Employer Heterogeneity
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Figure C.6: Theoretical Earnings Densities: 3-Point Employer Heterogeneity
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